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A REEXAMINATION OF VALUE, GOOD WILL,
AND BUSINESS LOSSES IN
EMINENT DOMAIN
Frank A. Aloi t and Arthur Abba Goldbergj
An expensive piece of equipment located in Mr. Smith's industrial
plant is necessary for the conduct of his business. The state decides to
condemn his property, thus forcing discontinuation of the business at
its present location. The equipment in question was specifically con-
structed for use at the present location and cannot be put to profitable
use elsewhere in a comparable business operation. Nevertheless, it is
physically removable from Mr. Smith's plant,1 although the cost of
removal would be so great that even the equipment's salvage value is
negligible.2 In addition, the relocation or forced discontinuation of the
business may cause the loss of the favorable customer relations and
market positions incidental to the established location.
Since a going business is an integrated whole, a condemning au-
thority ought to compensate a condemnee sufficiently for the provable
losses resulting from the interruption or forced discontinuation of his
business. If, as has uniformly been the case in the absence of remedial
legislation or constitutional amendment, the courts are unwilling to
accept this position, then they at least ought to permit the condemnee
to prove and collect damages for the difference between the value of
his equipment on the day of condemnation and its value after removal
from the plant, without regard to whether it is classified as a fixture in
terms of real property law. Unfortunately, there is little authority for
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1961, University of Rochester; M.P.A. 1962,
Syracuse University; LL.B. 1965, Cornell University.
$ Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey. A.B. 1962, American University;
LL.B. 1965, Cornell University. The authors wish to express their appreciation to John
Michael Maher and David M. Gross, students at the University of Connecticut Law
School, for their assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Maher was particularly
helpful in assisting the authors to think through the economic analysis.
1 See, e.g., State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 202 A.2d 401 (1964); Glen & Mohawk Milk
Ass'n v. State, 2 App. Div. 2d 95, 153 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1956).
2 The facts of State v. Gallant, 42 NJ. 583, 202 A.2d 401 (1964), graphically illustrate
this situation. A condemned factory contained several four-ton looms that could only be
moved to a new location if they were dismantled. To reassemble them would be a
complex engineering problem because of the wear pattern on the machines from forty
years of use. The cost of moving and reassembling would approach $40,000, a figure equal
to 4/5 the value of the looms. See also People v. Johnson & Co., 219 App. Div. 285, 219
N.Y.S. 741 (Ist Dep't 1927).
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either proposition. The cases generally speak in terms of an arbitrarily
determined "market value" standard for compensation, which errone-
ously analyzes the condemnor-condemnee relationship in terms of
existing real and personal property concepts without regard to the
economic implications of the situation. This article examines possible
solutions to this dilemma, some operating within the common law,
others within the realm of legislative or constitutional action.
I
THE PROBLEM OF FIXTURES-A HYBRID oF LAND AND CHATTELS
One axiom of condemnation law is that the condemning authority
compensates not only for the land taken but also for permanent im-
provements found upon it, i.e., buildings and any fixtures found
therein.3 A creature of common law used to determine which items,
3 See 4 NicHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.11 (3d ed. J. Sackman 1962).
The word "fixture" is derived from the Latin "affixum" meaning "a thing attached
to or fastened to." The most widely cited definition of "fixture ' is that stated in the
leading case of Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 527 (1853): "A fixture is an article which
was a chattel, but which by being physically annexed or affixed to the realty, became
accessory to it and part and parcel of it."
Three general tests have developed to determine whether an article is a fixture: (1)
annexation of the article to the land or something appurtenant thereto; (2) adaptation
of the article to the use of the property to which it is affixed; and (3) intention of the
annexing party to make the article a permanent accession to the land. With respect
to the first test, some states have passed statutes that define methods of annexation
sufficient to render the article a fixture. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 660 (West 1954),
providing:
A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by roots, as in
the case of trees, vines, or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of walls; or
permanently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently attached
to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or
screws.
Such statutes, however, have generally been held merely directory, and a determination
of annexation by other means remains possible. See, e.g., M,P. Moller, Inc. v, Wilson,
8 Cal. 2d 31, 63 P.2d 818 (1936).
The second test focuses on Whether the article by its nature and common ac-
ceptance is essential to the use and enjoymnent of the land, or whether it is for the con-
venience of the particular business conducted on the realty. The former makes it a fixture,
the latter a chattel. See Roseville Pottery, Inc. v. County Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St.
89, 77 N.E.2d 608 (1948).
For use of the third test see Citizens Bank v, Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 216 Ind.
573, 25 N.E.2d 444 (1940); DeCharettd's Guardian v. Bank of Shelbyville, 218 Ky. 691,
291 S.W. 1054 (1927).
What is a fixture in one set of circumstances may not be a fixture in a different set
of circumstances. Thus, chattels may be deemed fixtures as between grantor and grantee
or mortgagor and mortgagee, but may be deemed personalty as between landlord and
tenant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Polk, 389 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1965): Handler v. Hotig,
2 NJ. 18, 24-25, 65 A.2d 523, 526-27 (1949); Hays v. Doane, 11 NJ, Eq. 84, 96 (Ch. 1855).
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otherwise classified as personalty, would be considered part of the land,
the fixture concept had three distinct purposes: (1) to determine which
heir took when realty and personalty passed to different heirs,4 (2) to
determine the rights of competing creditors in a debtor's property,5 and
(3) to determine the relative rights of landlords and tenants concerning
items attached to the building or land by the tenant.6 Developed in
cases of rival claims to ownership, the fixture concept is inappropriately
utilized in condemnation cases, where the primary questions are those
of valuation.7 Nevertheless, the courts treat as compensable only
equipment that meets the criteria of a fixture in terms of real property
law. This rationale is defective insofar as the fixture concept is di-
vorced from modern economic analysis and thus is incapable of pro-
viding economically sound solutions to the complex problems of valua-
tion arising in today's condemnations.8
4 The fixture concept also determined the ability of decedent's creditors to reach
estate property, since at common law, real estate vested in the heir immediately upon the
death of the ancestor. Jenks v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 206 Mass. 591,
92 N.E. 998 (1910); Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898). Real estate (and hence
fixtures) were beyond the reach of decedent's creditors. See Wilson v. Channell, 102
Kan. 793, 175 P. 95 (1918).
5 Security Trust Co. v. Temple Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 514, 58 A. 865 (Ch. 1904).
6 Wright v. DuBignon, 114 Ga. 765, 40 S.E. 747 (1902) (domestic fixtures); Lindsay
Bros. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 236 Pa. 229, 84 A. 783 (1912) (trade fixtures); Carver v.
Gough, 153 Pa. 225, 25 A. 1124 (1893) (trade fixtures).
7 Similarly, the fixture concept seems an inappropriate tool f6r classifying property
in situations where the ad valorem tax is different for real and personal property. See
generally Roseville Pottery, Inc. v. County Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St. 89, 77 N.E.2d
608 (1948); Note, Defining Real Estate for the Tax Gatherer: Two Important Aspects of
the Problem in Pennsylvania Today, 12 U. Prrr. L. R-v. 604-07 (1951); cf. Commissioner
of Corps. & Taxation v. Assessors of Boston, 324 Mass. 32, 84 N.E.2d 531 (1949).
8 In limited instances legislatures have recognized the economic problems of destroy-
ing a going concern and have passed statutes authorizing payment of damages beyond
those traditionally awarded in condemnation cases. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071 (Supp. 1966)
provides that additional damages may be assessed and added to the value of the land
taken when (1) the taking is for right of way purposes, (2) the taking damages a business
in existence more than five years, (3) the business is owned by the condemnee, and (4) less
than the entire property is sought to be appropriated. To the same effect, see 19 VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 221(2) (1959), and the Water Supply Act, N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE
§ K51-44 (1963).
As early as 1933, Congress authorized the TVA to provide assistance to persons forcibly
displaced by TVA acquisitions. Also, under the federally aided urban renewal program
and under a number of highway programs, certain "incidental damages" are com-
pensable. In 1961 the Select Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisitions of the House
Committee on Public Works was established to analyze the wide variation in compensa-
tion under the many federal property-taking programs. See SELECr SuBcoM-M. ON REAL
PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88TI CONG., 2D Sass.,
STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFEGrED BY REAL PROPERTY Acqui-
SITION IN FEDERAL AM FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1965); cf. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:31B-1 (Supp. 1967).
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True value of a going concern and market value of the individual
parts may differ. But the difference apparently is overlooked by the
courts when they attempt to place a market value on land taken. Al-
though they purport to treat the state and the property owner as vendee
and vendor bargaining at arm's length in the private market,9 the courts
generally miss the crucial point that a willing buyer normally pays for
the value of the business as a going concern, including the value of
equipment especially designed for the building in which the business is
housed.10 The state can force a sale on a reluctant owner and, through
application of arbitrary valuation rules, become, in effect, a strong-arm
buyer. Since traditional condemnation law does not compensate the
property owner for going concern value, the inevitable result is that
the state gets a bargain price.
II
NEw YoRK's ATrEMPT To REACH THE DESIRED RESULT:
TIm SPECIALTY THEORY11
Through a line of cases stretching over a hundred years, the New
York courts have evolved a partial method of paying for business losses
by compensating a landowner for business property that would lose
substantially all its value when removed from the premises, even though
such property might not be classified as a fixture. In the leading case
of Jackson v. State,12 Judge Cardozo recognized that property used as a
part of a business may have a value in excess of market value. Machinery
attached to a going plant "may produce an enhancement of value as
See generally Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment:
Incidental Losses, 67 YAXE L.J. 61 (1957).
9 "The State stands toward the owner as buyer toward seller." Jackson v. State, 213
N.Y. 34, 35, 106 N.E. 758 (1914). See also SparkiU Realty Corp. v. State, 254 App. Div. 78,
4 N.Y.S.2d 679 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 279 N.Y. 656, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938).
10 In State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 590, 202 A.2d 401, 405 (1964), however, this point
was made clearly by Justice Haneman:
The value of a factory containing industrial equipment employed in the business
for which the property is being used is ordinarily greater than that of an empty
and idle building. Such equipment in place adds more to the value of the realty
than its second-hand salvage value separated from the premises. An owner who
is under no duress, and where the building and machinery are a functional unit,
would undoubtedly sell only at a price which would reflect that increased value.
11 What is here called the specialty theory has also been referred to as the institu-
tional theory by New Jersey courts and the industrial plant doctrine by Pennsylvania
courts. See Robinson, McGough, & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. Prrr. L. R V. 89, 94 (1955); Note,
supra note 7.
12 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
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great as it did when new. The law gives no sanction to so obvious an
injustice as would result if the owner were held to forfeit all these
elements of value."' 3 His decision was followed by a classic series of
cases refining and limiting this concept. New York easily could have
reached the same result, however, through analysis of the problem in
terms of the marginal efficiency of factors of production.14 But such an
approach would have required a complete repudiation of prior au-
thority-in other words, a master stroke of judicial "legislation." New
York has not taken this route, but rather has evolved a "specialty
theory" of compensation, the most advanced common law development
to date.
In distinguishing between fixtures and personal property for
purposes of valuation in condemnation proceedings, the early New
York cases, like those in other jurisdictions, placed special emphasis on
the element of physical attachment.' 5 The more substantial or per-
manent the degree of affixation, the more likely the item would be
classified as a fixture and therefore be compensable. Later New York
cases used the intention of the owner, viewed in terms of permanence
and adaptability, as the primary test.16 In addition to compensation
for the land and buildings, this theory allowed compensation for any
machinery that the owner intended to retain upon the realty and wag
essential to his use of the land.11 The physical attachment became of
incidental importance.
The earliest condemnation case focusing on the factor of special
construction and use was In re City of New York (North River Water
Front),'8 which involved condemnation of a building fitted with ma-
chinery for the manufacture of boiler equipment. The city contended
13 Id. at 36, 106 N.E. at 758. See also In re City of New York (Seward Park Slum
Clearance Project), 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Ist Dep't 1960). Many cases,
however, give sanction to this unjust disposition of condemnation awards. Thus, City of Los
Angeles v. Siegel, 230 Cal. App. 2d 982, 41 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1964), rejected the lessees
contention that he should be reimbursed for items of personal property that were
severed from his restaurant and former liquor business by a condemnation action, thus
becoming essentially valueless. See also United States v. 116.00 Acres of Land, 227 F. Supp.
100, 106 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
14 See pp. 62-25 infra.
15 In re City of New York (Twelfth Ward), 39 App. Div. 589, 57 N.Y.S. 657 (Ist
Dep't 1899); Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N.Y; Sup. Ct. 1839); Phipps v. State, 69
Misc. 295, 127 N.Y.S. 260 (Ct. Cl. 1910).
16 See Ih re City of New York (North River Water Front), 118 App. Div. 865, 103
N.Y.S. 908 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 189 N.Y. 508, 81 N.E. 1162 (1907).
17 McRea V. Central Nat'l Bank, 66 N.Y. 489 (1876) (a Vendor-vendee situation).
's 118 App. Div. 865, 103 N.Y.S. 908 (Ist Dep't), aff'd mem., 189 N.Y. 508, 81 N.E. 1162
(1907).
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that it was liable only for the land and building, since it did not take
any of the machinery located in the building. The machinery was con-
structed on foundations sunk into the ground and was connected by
shafting to either steam or croton water pipes. Most of the machinery
could have been removed from the building without seriously damag-
ing the land or the building. In holding the machinery compensable,
the court stated the general rule as follows;
[O]n the condemnation of property the owners of the buildings and
leasehold are entitled to be paid the fair market value of the
buildings as they exist, together with such permanent machinery
as has been built into the buildings and used in connection with
the leasehold estate for business purposes.19
Conceding that personal property readily removable from the building
and having a substantial value if disconnected from it would not be
compensable, the court cautioned that:
[A]s far as the property has become a real part of the building
constructed for the particular use to which it is put by the tenant,
it seems.., that the tenant is entitled to what that property in use
in connection with his leasehold is reasonably worth.20
The eloquence and analysis of Judge Cardozo made Jackson v.
State 21 the leading early case developing the specialty theory, even
though North River Water Front preceeded it by seven years. Claim-
ant's warehouse containing machinery, shafting, elevators, and conveyors
was appropriated for the use of the Barge Canal. The building was
valued at 9,000 and the land at $4,353,20. In awarding compensation
for the machinery, the court of appeals stated two interrelated, yet
separable, theories. The first simply emphasized that the former chattels
had become compensable fixtures22 But Judge Cardozo went on to
comment:
Condemnation is an enforced sale, and the State stands toward
the owner as buyer toward seller. On that basis the rights and duties
of each must be determined. It is intolerable that the State, after
condemning a factory or warehouse, should surrender to the owner
a stock of second-hand machinery and in so doing discharge the full
measure of its duty. Severed from the building, such machinery
commands only the prices of second-hand articles; attached to a
going plant, it may produce an enhancement of value as great as it
did when new. The law gives no sanction to so obvious an injustice
19 Id. at 866, 103 N.Y.S. at 909.
20 Id. at 867, 103 N.Y,S, at 909 (dictum). This dictum enunciates the specialty theory
by adding the value of the special equipment to the land.
21 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
22 Id. at 35, 106 N.E. at 758.
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as would result if the owner were held to forfeit all these elements
of value.23
Though still operating within the traditional realty-personalty di-
chotomy, Cardozo's core concept was "enhancement of value." He
seemed less concerned with the fixture concept than with a unit theory
of valuation that considered the land and everything on it as a whole.24
Eleven years later, in Banner Milling Co. v. State,25 the court of
appeals again hinted at an enhancement-of-value theory in determining
what items were compensable in a flour milling operation. Holding
that the land and fixtures were to be valued as a whole, the court not
only stated what has become known as the unit rule of valuation2 but
also appeared to go further by quoting from the opinion below:
The claimant is entitled to recover the value of its physical property
as it existed at the time of the appropriation. That does not mean
that its value is to be arrived at by taking the value of the various
elements and items making up the property separately, and con-
sidering them without reference to each other, and then adding
together these sums. The claimant is entitled to compensation, not
merely for so much land, so much brick, lumber, materials and
machinery considered separately, but if they have been combined,
adjusted, synchronized and perfected into an efficient functioning
unit of property, then it must be paid for that unit, so combined,
adjusted, synchronized and perfected, as it existed at the moment of
appropriation. In that limited sense, it is entitled to the "going
value"- if such a term is permissible-of its physical property.27
Although on its face the quoted language can be read as a carte blanche
endorsement of a "going value" theory, subsequent decisions continued
to have difficulty with the meaning of Banner Milling and with the
going-value concept generally.
23 Id. at 35-36, 106 N.E. at 758.
24 It should also be noted that the opinion placed emphasis not on what the state
took but rather on what the owner lost. Jackson is cited for this interpretation in Sparkill
Realty Corp. v. State, 254 App. Div. 78, 82, 4 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 279 N.Y.
656, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938), where the court said:
It is settled beyond question that respondents are entitled to recover the fair
market value of their property based on the most advantageous use to which it
could be put. In the case appellant occupies the status of a purchaser.
This should be the core concept of the law of eminent domain, since the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is "to fix an amount of money that will roughly indemnify
the owner for the loss of his condemned property." 1 L. OaRGF, VALUATION UNDER THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (2d ed. 1953).
25 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925).
26 The unit rule of valuation is spelled out in 4 NicHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra
note 3, § 13.12(1), at 366-67.
27 240 N.Y. 533, 544, 148 N.E. 668, 692, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925).
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People v. Isaac Johnson & Co. 2 8 limited the going-value interpreta-
tion of Banner Milling. The Johnson court did not. view Banner Mill-
ing as sanctioning compensation -for personal property- merely because
that property contributed to the going value of the parcel. Only those
items of property that qualify as fixtures under the traditional property
definition or the permanence and adaptability definition can con-
tribute to the calculations of going value.29
Thus, Johnson focused upon "fixtureness" and thereby read
Banner Milling restrictively. But the court did not seem entirely satis-
fied with its conclusion. After stating the claimant's argument for
recovery, Judge McAvoy commented:
While this is a substantial item of damage and would appear as a
matter of first impression to be a proper basis for an award, yet the
rule in this State . . . is against the payment for any personal
property in a condemnation of land by the State which remains the
property of the claimant . . .30
Thus, if the Johnson court had not been burdened by precedent, it
might have allowed the claim for so-called personal property. But, as
an intermediate court, it felt compelled to follow what it compre-
hended to be pronouncements of the court of appeals in Banner Milling
and Jackson. To the Johnson court, the Jackson case simply held that
"an appropriation of land... is an appropriation of all that is annexed
to the land, whether classified as buildings or as fixtures." 31 Though
technically correct, this reading of the Jackson case ignores Cardozo's
statements that the state must compensate the owner of a factory or
warehouse for the machinery used in its operations, because after
severance the machinery would command only the price of a second-
hand article, whereas when attached to a going plant it could produce
an enhancement of value as great as it did when new.32
Jackson, Banner Milling, and Johnson all used some form of going-
value yardstick within the traditional limitations of the fixture cases.
28 219 App. Div. 285, 219 N.Y.S. 741 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 627, 157 N.E. 885,
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927).
29 Id. at 288-89, 219 N.Y.S. at 744.
30 Id. at 288, 219 N.Y.S. at 744. If Judge McAvoy is taken literally, the problem can
be solved by having the state take title to the personal property.
31 Id. at 289, 219 N.Y.S. at 744-45.
32 See pp. 609-10 & note 23 supra. It may be significant that in this particular part of
the Jackson opinion, Cardozo did not refer to fixtures but rather spoke only about
machinery. It is therefore possible that Cardozo was proposing a new theory based upon
equitable considerations in which machinery, even if technically classified as personal
property, would be compensable if integrated into the operation of a going concern. If
this be so, then Johnson is clearly over-restrictive.
1968]
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But not until 1956, in Glen & Mohawk Milk Association v, State,a did
a New York court admit that the going-value theory might be different
from the fixture theory. The case involved a claim arising out of the
appropriation of a plant specially constructed to receive and process
milk.84 The court of claims awarded damages on the basis that "[t]he
buildings on this property were especially built and equipped for the
receiving and processing of milk, and constituted an 'adjusted, synchron-
ized and perfected' unit.' 35 On appeal, the state argued that much of
the property for which compensation was awarded was noncompensable
personal property. Rejecting this contention, the Appellate Division for
the Third Department held:
An allowance was made for the "difference between the value of
the machinery and equipment . . . and the value which such ma-
chinery and equipment added to the real property when used in
connection therewith as a 'going concern' in full operation." This
was done upon the theory that the machinery and equipment when
in the buildings enhanced the value of the real property and perma-
nent fixtures.36
The court thus placed primary emphasis on a specialty concept, valu-
ing a unitary, specially constructed business entity as a whole. The
items in dispute were treated not as permanent fixtures but merely as
enhancing the value of the fixtures. The court, however, subjected its
holding to two important limitations: (1) the use in question (milk
processing) was the only use for which these items were adaptable, and
(2) compensation was not allowed for personal property as such.37
Liberally construed, Glen & Mohawk can be cited as a complete
repudiation of the realty-personalty dichotomy, with a new emphasis
on going-concern value as the standard of valuation. Narrowly inter-
preted, the opinion merely utilizes the specialty concept to avoid the
personal property limitation by creating a dual classification of fixtures:
permanent fixtures3 8 and some other undefined fixtures that add to the
value of the realty and the permanent fixtures.39
33 2 App. Div. 2d 95, 153 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1956).
34 The property is described in detail in id. at 96-97, 153 NY.S.2d at 727.
35 Glen & Mohawk Milk Ass'n v. State, 207 Misc. 1130, 1132, 143 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (Ct.
Cl. 1955).
36 2 App. Div. 2d at 97, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
88 The landmark American fixture case, TeafE v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 51i, 524 (1853),
stated that anything other than a permanent fixture was a contradiction in terms.
39 The court apparently substituted the criterion of "special construction" for the
prior liberal definition of fixtures in terms of "permanence" and "adaptability." Thus,
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The theory formulated in Glen & Mohawk has had a discernible
impact on later decisions. Increasingly the courts have expressly recog-
nized going-concern value as a compensable item of damages in a
condemnation award.40 Two subsequent decisions illustrate this liberal-
ization of judicial attitude.
In re City of New York (Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project)41
compensated a landowner for readily detachable personalty in an ice-
making plant; each item was found to contribute to "an efficiently func-
tioning unit, usefully employed in the manufacture of ice." 42 In award-
ing compensation for all machinery in the plant, the court used the
liberal theory of fixtureness 43 and implied that it would have awarded
additional damages had the claimant introduced competent proof of
going-concern or specialty-operation value.44
an indirect and perhaps unintentional result of the court's eff9rt tQ avoid conflict with
the maxim tsat personal property is not compensable is a further liberalization of the
definition of fixtureness for condemnation purposes. Stretching this theory to its outer
limits, an item of property that would not qualify as a fixture under either the "affixa-
tion" test or the "permanence" and "adaptability" test coulld conceivably become cgi.-
pensable if specially constructed for use in a "going concern."
40 Admittedly, there is some confusion over terminology; the terms "going concern,"
"going value," and "specialty operation" appear to have been used interchangeably in
describing the same theory of compensation. However, we believe specialty operation to
be most descriptive of the specific theory of compensation under discussion.
41 24 Misc. 2d 190, 201 NY.S,2d 443 (Sup. Ct, 1959), modified, 15 App. Div. 2d 153,
222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Ist Dep't 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30
(1963).
42 Id. at 192, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 448. The items included transformers, panel boxes,
distillers, chemical tanks, water filters, sump pumps, and an ice cube hoisting machine.
14. at g05, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63. Significantly, the court also concluded that the plant had
an excellent business location. Id, at 192, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
43 All of the machinery and equipment in dispute ... were put in the buildings
by the owner with the intention that they shoull remain upon the land and were
essential to the use which the owner made of it. The necessary tests of permanence
and adaptability having thus been met, it is not necessary to prove immovability,
since we are dealing with an owner rather than a tenant.
Id. at 195, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 451. On the basis of this rule of valuation, the court goncluded:
Since the character of the structures was well adapted to the land, and since
earning capacity is not applicable in view of their specialized nature
, 
the measure
of the value which they added to the land is the "testimony of structural value,
which is but another name for cost of reproduction, after miaking proper deduc-
tion for wear and tear.
Id. at 192, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
44 I believe that the foregoing awards . ..give full consideration to whatever
"going value" was proved to exist in this plant. In the Banner Milling case . ..
the proof established that the business had produced for the claimant average
earnings of over $50,000 annually. In the casq at bar, claimant offered no con-
petent proof of earnings, so that the only test of value is reproduction cost, less
depreciation.
Id. at 204, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
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In re City of New York (Seward Park Slum Clearance Project)45
provides one of the clearest statements of a specialty theory. After
conceding that the owner of a funeral parlor could receive compensa-
tion for fixtures, the court stated that "it seems that an award in con-
demnation may also be made for property, albeit readily removable
without damage to the freehold, if such property were used for business
purposes and would lose substantially all of its value after sever-
ance . -46 The court's emphasis on use for business purposes rather
than on the traditional adaptation and permanence criteria is an indica-
tion of the direction in which New York may go.
In sum, it is clear that New York courts hold, consistently with
other jurisdictions,47 that an owner of personal property is not entitled
to compensation for the damage to or removal cost of personal property
when land is taken in a condemnation proceeding. Yet, contrary to most
jurisdictions, New York seems to hold that, when removal of custom-
built personal property would destroy its value, it should be deemed
a fixture and therefore compensable. 48 New York is straining to escape
the realty-personalty distinction in order to compensate for an item
that is an integral part of a business operation regardless of the label
pinned on it. In short, New York is attempting a functional approach
to the problem.
45 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1960).
46 Id. at 500, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (emphasis added). See also People ex tel. Hotel
Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 83 N.E.2d 839 (1949) (valuing hotel property
in a tax case); In re City of New York (Kramer Realty Corp.), 16 App. Div. 2d 148, 226
N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1094, 240 N.Y.S.2d 160, 190 N.E.2d 533 (1963)
(valuing a formica plant as a specialty); In re City of New York (Newoak Realty Co.), 13
App. Div. 2d 668, 213 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't 1961) (holding that the plant might be "in-
tegrated" and valued as a specialty while the building in which the plant was operated
was not unique); In re City of New York (Field's Baking Corp.), 27 App. Div. 2d 539, 275
N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1966) (valuing a bakery as a specialty).
47 E.g., State v. Hansen, 80 Idaho 201, 327 P.2d 366 (1958); In re Appropriation for
Highway Purposes, 167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E.2d 30 (1958).
48 Marraro v. New York, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963);
In re City of New York (Seward Park Slum Clearance Project), 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200
N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1960). In addition to the specialty theory, New York also added
a new wrinkle to the traditional fixture rules for compensation by holding that where
a condemnation forces the premature removal of a fixture the owner (or tenant, as the
case may be) is entitled to an award in the amount of the value of the fixture less salvage,
notwithstanding that the fixture was actually removed by the owner. City of Buffalo v.
Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 209 N.E.2d 776, 262 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1965); Cooney Bros., Inc. v. State,
27 App. Div. 2d 93, 276 N.Y.S.2d 337 (3d Dep't 1966).,
Other courts have occasionally compensated for damage to all personal property
caused by removal. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R. v. Hock, 118 Il. 587, 9 N.E. 205 (1886). The
problem with this approach is that even if not damaged, the item may still be valueless
when removed.
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III
A SURMISE ON APPRAISAL JUGGLING: ANOTHER METHOD
OF REACHING THE DESIRED RESULT
At the risk of elevating what at best is conjecture or an educated
guess to the level of fact, the authors believe that the courts are com-
pensating for damages to equipment and for an overall going-concern
value necessarily including good will through a liberal application of
certain appraisal techniques. Specifically, appraisal by means of capital-
izing income49 and estimating reproduction cost less depreciation50
are the villains or heroes of the piece, depending upon one's point of
view.
The "market data" or "comparable sales" approach, a third
method, is considered the most reliable way of establishing market
value.51 It purports to be objective, "because records are easily available
and because it is a good criterion of what the fictitious willing seller
will accept for his property and what the fictitious willing buyer will
pay for it."'02 The courts seem unperturbed by what some of their
brethren term the essential "subjectivity" of determining the com-
parability of any two pieces of property; 53 and they seem unaware that
49 The capitalized income method is best described as an attempt to measure the
present value of the future income potential of a property. This present value is deter-
mined by dividing a capitalization rate (an estimate of the security and length of the
income flow) into the yearly projected income.
See generally Doner v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 796, 798, 268 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505-06 (Ct. Cl.
1966) (discussing the Inwood Method of capitalizing income); G. SCHMu-JZ, CONDEmNATION
APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 60-64 (rev. ed. E. Rams 1963) (discussing the Ellwood Analysis for
projecting the value of property); 19 N.Y. JuR. Eminent Domain § 191, at 480 (1961).
50 The reproduction-cost-less-depreciation method has been described as "the price
a reasonable man would pay to reproduce the structure less depreciation from all causes,
physical wear, functional obsolescence, economic obsolescence." G. LEFCOE, LAND DEvEL-
OPMENT LAw 114 (1966). Obviously, this method is inapplicable to valuation of land, which
neither costs money to build nor depreciates. Thus, when both buildings and land are
condemned, the reproduction-cost-less-depreciation method may be used for the structure
and another method may be used for the land. Id. See generally In re City of New York
(Blackwell's Island Bridge), 198 N.Y. 84, 87-88, 91 N.E. 278, 279 (1910); 19 N.Y. JUR.
Eminent Domain § 180 (1961).
51 See, e.g., ABA REPORT OF COMiMrI-EE ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PRO-
cEDuRE 38 (1962).
52 ABA REPORT OF COIM=n-rE ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE 85
(1966).
53 But cf. Weber v. State, 25 App. Div. 2d 584-85, 267 N.Y.S.2d 152, 158 (Sd Dep't
1966):
We find without merit the State's contention that proof of sales of comparable
properties was conclusive as against expert testimony of higher values; . . . sales
that are "comparable" are just that and proof thereof by no means assumes iden-
tical location or identical value.
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the sales price of so-called comparable property often contains incre-
ments attributable to such "noncompensable items" as going concern
value, good will, and business location.54 Preference for the compar-
able sales technique has limited the use of other valuation techniques.55
In general, capitalization of income is used only when rental
property, rather than business profits, is involved.56 And reproduction
cost less depreciation is used only with specialty property, ie., specially
constructed or otherwise unique property for which there is no readily
determinable market.57 These restrictions may be rooted in a distrust
for the "economic" nature of these methods. Also, capitalization of
business profits seemingly goes against the rule that only the land on
which the business is conducted, not the business, is taken. The com-
parable sales technique, on the other hand, is apparently viewed as a
part of conveyancing law, and thus fits with the notion that eminent
domain is merely an offshoot of real property law and should have
"standard objective" rules.5 In recent years, however, the courts have
54 See pp. 626-36 infra.
55 19 N.Y. JuR. Eminent Domain § 180, at 410 (1961), prefaces its discussion of struc-
tural or reproduction costs with the following comment: "As a general rule, the measure
of compensation upon the appropriation of land and buildings or improvements is the
value of the land as enhanced by such improvements, and not the cost of the improve-
ments." (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) See also Village of St. Johnsville v. Smith,
184 N.Y. 341, 350, 77 N.E. 617, 620-21 (1906).
50 19 N.Y. Jun. Eminent Domain § 189 (1961). See also Sill Corp. v. United States,
343 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 289 F. Supp.
822 (D. Colo. 1965); A. JAR, EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION AND PROCEDUPr § 150, at 232-38;
4 NcmnoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 12.3121[3], at 124-25.
57 See 19 N.Y. JUR. Eminent Domain § 180, at 411-12 (1961).
Kendall v. State, 168 So. 2d 840 (La. Ct. App, 1964), is a classic example of a unique im-
provement. The property there included an artificial lake that appreciably enhanced its
market value. The court awarded the cost of restoring the lake. See also State v. Ouachita
Parish School Bd., 162 So. 2d 397 (La. Ct. App. 1964), where the proper measure of
damages for appropriation of a school's playground was held to be the reproduction cost
less depreciation and residual value for other purposes of the entire plant.
The various departments of New York's Appellate Division are split on whether
proof of reproduction cost less depreciation should be allowed in most cases. See, e.g.,
Case v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 704 (4th Dep't 1967) (especially Record on Appeal and Briefs);
Guthmuller v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 597, 256 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1965); In re City of
New York (Newoak Realty Co.), 13 App. Div. 2d 668, 213 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't
1961), modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1007, 189 N.E.2d 627, 289 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1963);
In re City of Rochester (Smith Street Bridge), 284 App. Div. 583, 586, 255 N.Y.S. 801, 807
(4th Dep't 1932).
The term "specialty," as used in determining the propriety of reproduction cost less
depreciation, generally describes a structure with a "limited, if any, market." 19 N.Y. JuR.
Eminent Domain § 180, at 412 (1961); see Nissenbaum v. State, 24 App. Div. 2d 807, 263
N.Y.S.2d 756 (3d Dep't 1965).
58 Professor Lefcoe points out many difficulties with this so-called "objective"
standard:
The sales method directs attention to "recent sales of similar property." Hence,
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expanded the use of both the capitalization-of-income and reproduction-
cost-less-depreciation techniques, perhaps with a view toward eventually
changing the underlying substantive rules,59
This trend is dearest in the cases that use these theoretically im-
permissible techniques as a method of "checking" the accuracy of the
market data approach.60 In In re City of Rochester v. Friedman"1 an
urban renewal project required condemnation of a parcel that was al-
most entirely occupied by a profitable baby furniture store. The owner's
expert capitalized income using a "hypothetical" rental for the prem-
ises, based upon rentals for comparable structures.6 2 He also used re-
placement cost less depreciation to value improvements, and both
experts used the market data approach based on comparable sales.0 3
The court, however, discounted all "comparables" on the ground that
they differed substantially from the subject premises in "location, na-
ture, condition of the improvements, utilization factors leading to sale
a relevant time span must be chosen, that is when land prices were roughly the
same level as at the date of valuation. Temporary "fluctuations" must be dis-
counted. If the date of valuation occurs during a temporary fluctuation, what
adjustment, if any, should be made when comparing similar sales? More than the
changing values in land prices must be considered; the purchasing power of
money fluctuates as well, What if the date of valuation falls during an inflation or
a depression? Is the landowner's claim the same and equally valid in an inflation
as it would be in a depression; in a long run as opposed to a short run depression
or inflation?
Since we are to consider only similar properties, adjustments must be made
for those inevitable differences: location, quality of construction, materials, and
design; amenities like a view or freedom from noise; and so on. How are zoning
differences to be treated? The terms and conditions of these other sales must be
studied; for example, were they for cash or credit? Once upon a time, the price
was lower when paid all in cash; the Internal Revenue Code now places a pre-
mium on the credit transaction, so that in some cities a buyer who insists on
paying cash must pay a five to ten percent premium. In determining "just com-
pensation," should it matter that, in fact, the government pays the condemnee in
cash?
G. LEFcoE, supra note 50, at 122.
59 See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Union Quany & Constr. Co., 394 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.
1965) (evidence of profits allowed in valuation of dump); United States v. Eden Memorial
Park Ass'n, 350 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1965) (capitalization applied to funeral parlor).
60 Thus, in In re dHuie, 2 N.Y.2d 168, 171, 139 N.E.2d 140, 142, 157 N.Y.S.2d 957,
960-61 (1956), the New York Court of Appeals asserted:
In the determination of that just compensation, there is no single element which
is controlling, and it is competent for the commissioners of appraisal to consider
all factors indicative of the value of the property, such as its fair market value
as of the date of appropriation .... the reproduction cost of improvements ....
sales of similar property .... location .... income . . . .highest suitable use
... .and consequential damages to property not taken but affected by the
condemnor's use ....
See also Bond v. State, 24 App. Div. 2d 778, 263 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (3d Dep't 1965).
61 No. 7612-64, Memorandum decision filed in office of Monroe County Clerk (Sup. Ct.,
July 12, 1967).
62 Id. at 4,
63 Id. at 4-5.
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and time of sale . . . .- 64 The city strenuously objected to the use of
replacement cost less depreciation to value the improvements, but the
court explained that, although the improvements "were neither unique
nor a specialty," 65 the replacement-cost-less-depreciation data were ad-
missible insofar as they "were used simply as a means of checking their
estimate of value and were not deemed controlling."6 6 Without break-
ing down its computation, the court concluded that the "sound market
value" at the time of taking was $125,000, a figure closer to the owner's
estimate of $149,000 than to the city's figure of $69,700. The court
commented that it "regarded the preponderance of the evidence as
favoring a finding that the subject premises should be treated as a
single unit, both as to the valuation of the land and the improvements
which fully covered it."67
Capitalization of income based upon hypothetical rentals neces-
sarily involves some element of going-concern value, since such rentals
must be based not on the rental of dormant space but rather on the
rental of the premises as an operating entity at its highest and best use.
The court in Friedman may have regarded these rentals as including
going-concern value, since it talked of the "location, character of the
neighborhood and proximity to other furniture and appliance stores
[as] . . . factors throwing light on fair market value."6 Although un-
supported by the opinion's express language, this conclusion gains
strength from the court's apparent use of the capitalization-of-income
technique.
Norman's Kill Farm Dairy Co. v. State69 demonstrates that similar
wonders can be worked solely through the use of the replacement-cost-
less-depreciation technique. 0 Norman's Kill involved the appropria-
64 Id. at 5.
65 Id. at 6.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Id. at 7.
68 Id. at 6; cf. Sunnybrook Realty Co. v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 888, 203 N.Y.S.2d
286 (3d Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 960, 176 N.E.2d 203, 217 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1961), which
involved, among other things, the appropriation of property upon which was operated
a gasoline station and tire sales agency. The claimant's expert used the capitalization
method while the state's expert insisted on examining only comparable sales and repro-
duction cost less depreciation. On appeal by the state, the court reduced the award but
did not disapprove the claimant's use of capitalization.
This court recently pointed out . . . that capitalization of net rental value is a
factor which may be taken into consideration in arriving at the fair market value
of property. There, as here, the rental value was based on profit derived from the
business conducted on the property and the property was unusual because of its
location and the installation thereon.
Id. at 889, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
69 53 Misc. 2d 578, 279 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
70 A comment in Gurwitz v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 781, 211 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Ct. Cl. 1961),
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tion of an old but unusually profitable dairy products processing plant.
As a prerequisite to utilizing the replacement-cost-less-depreciation
method, the court first determined that the property was a "specialty."' 71
Though in theory this method should be used to determine only the
cost of replacing the physical plant, without any consideration of the
business actually carried on,72 the court emphasized:
The uncontroverted fact that claimant's profits were sub-
stantial as well as substantially above the norm for diary businesses
would tend to support the conclusion that the structural improve-
ments were well-adapted to the site, and it is clear that income or'
profits produced in a "specialty" operation are relevant on that
particular issue.73
Bowing to the maxim that good will is not compensable, the court
paused to caution:
Although claimant's business could be categorized as very success-
ful, the court has given due consideration to the obvious importance
of skilled management and good will which, of course, were not
affected by the appropriation of claimant's property.74
Since the state is paying only for the cost of replacing the physical plant
and not for loss of profits, business interruption, and destruction of
good will, the court's reliance solely upon cost of replacement seems
inadequate. The suspicion remains that relying on a past record of
profits to indicate adaptability to a particular use must eventually mani-
fest itself in a dollars and cents increment in the value of the property.
But paying for profits upon the taking of a going business, though
economically sound,75 is legally improper.7 6 Or is it?
aft'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 712, 223 N.Y.S.2d 854 (3d Dep't 1962) gives rise to a suspicion that
profits are included in reproduction-cost-less-depreciation valuations: "It is a fact that
evaluation of fixtures on the basis of reproduction cost less depreciation results invariably
in assigning a higher value to the fixture than it would be worth at its normal market
value." Id. at 736, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (emphasis added).
71 53 Misc. 2d at 580, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
72 See note 50 supra.
73 53 Misc. 2d at 581, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
74 Id. at 582, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
75 See pp. 629-50 infra.
76 The New York Court of Appeals in St. Agnes Cemetery v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 37, 143
N.E.2d 377, 163 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1957), distinguished between payment for lost profits, which
it recognized as not allowable, and consideration of "clearly to be expected future earn-
ings" as a means of valuing condemned cemetery lots. With reference to cases in which
awards were based on the stated rental of land to be received under outstanding leases,
the court stated:
Superficially it would appear in these cases that the trial court reached a
value derived from capitalization of profits, a theory of appraisal which has been
condemned (United States ex rel. T..A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266) but actually
1968]
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Some courts, perhaps tiring of the circumspection incident to the
appraisal juggling game,77 have taken cautious, though undeniably
direct, steps toward, payment for business losses-specifically, lost
profits.78
In City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Construction Co.,70 the
this court, conscious that business profits are not allowable, adopted the rule
that present value of "clearly to-be-expected future earnings may be considered"
(Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Term. v. City of New York, 139 F.2d 1007, 1013 [C.A. 2d),
Ann. 152 A.L.R. 29Q, 307, cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747). The method of valuing real
property on the basis of earnings past as well as prospective was considered appro-
priate in those cases. The Court of Claims has utilized that method as supported
by actual sales. In this case the theory of damage and method of appraisal are
based upon a proof of loss of the value of the land itself, not a capitalization
of profits.
Id. at 45, 143 N.E.2d at 382, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 662-63. But how "clearly to-be-expected"
must future profits be before they are compensable? If one concedes that nothing is more
certain than death and taxes, the key to certainty in the foregoing case may be that it
involved appropriation of a cemetery.
77 Occasionally a court rebukes those involved in producing appraisals with wide
and unsubstantiated discrepancies.
This court has said repeatedly, that a citizen whose property is taken away
without his consent is entitled to receive by either direct negotiation with the
condemnor or through a court decree the top honest dollar-no more and no
less, The condemning authority has no moral right to seek out cheap or low ap-
praisals but should be willing and prepared to pay the property owner full and
just compensation. Those representing the property owner are just as guilty if
they seek to obtain experts who will testify to exorbitant and unbelievable values.
Murphy v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 906, 908, 247 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (emphasis in
original). It is perhaps because of this concern that the claimant receive the top honest
dollar compensation that the courts themselves are on occasion compelled to indulge in
appraisal juggling in order to avoid archaic valuation limitations.
78 In In re City of New York (School of Industrials Arts), 2 Misc. 2d 403, 154 N.Y.S.2d
402 (Sup. Ct. 1956) the advantages of an income approach were described:
Those who would endeavor to extend this principle so as to limit "value"
to the original cost of construction or the current cost of reconstruction less de-
preciation are adopting an economic theory which derives from Adam Smith's
classic doctrine that the value of an article equals the cost of its production. The
modern appraiser has learned that the law of supply and demand will furnish a
more correct index of value and that "market value," the standard in condem-
nation, is determined not so much by cost as by the relative desirability, abun-
dance and utility of the particular property in the community.
We thus arrive at the capitalization of income method, It is obvious, of
course, that the prime factor in the mind of the buyer who invests in real prop-
erty is the realizable income therefrom. This is truly the product of the inter-
play of the forces of supply and demand. It is necessary, of course, to keep in
mind that it is property which is being valued and not the business conducted
thereon, and hence goodwill or elements of income influenced by management or
method of operation in determining the basic income attributable to the property
as such or its rental value. This concept of valuation is based on the idea that
the net income derivable from a use of the property to which it is best adapted,
when capitalized at the prevailing local rate of investment return, will produce
a sum which is the practical equivalent of its true value.
Id. at 407-08, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
79 394 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. 1965). See note 59 supra.
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court applied the capitalizationof-profits method to a dump-yard in
what may prove to be a noteworthy departure from generally applied
restrictions.
The general rule [that business profits are iniadtistible as
evidence of the value of the land on which the business is operated],
however, must be given an exception ex necessitate in this ease,
where the business is inextricably related to and connected with
the land where it is located, so that an appropriation of the land
means an appropriation of the business; where the evidence of
net profits apparently is cleat, certain and easily calculable, based
upon complete records; where past income figures are relatively
stable, average and representative, and future projections are based
upon reasonable probability of permanence or persistence in the
future, so that conjecture is minimized as far as possible .... o
Earlier in its opinion the court had commented that:
[W] here the character of the property is such that a profit is pro-
duced by the property itself without the labor of the owners being
expended thereon, and where the profits derived from its use are
the chief source of its value, evidence of such profits was properly
admitted and is relevant as a criterion of the value of the property.81
Whether the business of operating a dump is any more "taken" than,
for example, an ordinary manufacturing business, is debatable. In both
cases, the physical plant, be it land alone or land and buildings, is in fact
appropriated. Perhaps the court was unimpressed with its own distinc-
tion, since it noted that the operation of the dump did not require
"any considerable skill, wisdom, ingenuity or labor on the part of the
owners."8' 2 The fact remains, however, that in many ordinary condemna-
tion cases detailed business records, a history of stable profits and the
probability of predictable future profits may be present. Even that
personal unknown, management, would probably present no real prob-
lem, since the valuation equation could at least in theory include a
percentage deduction for the so-called "human" element. Notwith-
80 394 S.W.2d at 306 (footnote omitted).
81 Id. at 305-06 (footnote omitted).
82 Id. at 305 n.l But see Shelby. County R-IV School District v. Herman, 392
S.V.2d 609, 613 (Mo. 1965), in which the same Court reiterated the old rule that "[e]vi-
dence of profits derived from a commercial business upon land taken for public use is
ordinarily inadmissible as a basis upon which tO ascertinft mftrket Value in condenination
proceedings because it is too speculative, remote and uncertaii," (Emphasis in original.)
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1958 illustrate this seemingly
ambivalent attitude of the courts; while generally holding that profits cannot be capital-
ized, they appear to leave room for exception where profits supposedly are derived from
the land itself. See Hot Spring County v. Crawfortd, 229 Aik. 518, 316 S.W.2d 834 (1958);
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Addy, 229 Ark. 768, 318 S.W.2d 595 (1958).
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standing its limitations, Union Quarry is another example of an increas-
ing judicial tendency to use novel and economically sound appraisal
techniques to cut through old prohibitions.8 3
Use of these appraisal techniques may, of course, be the result of
a reexamination of the underlying substantive valuation rules. But the
courts probably have not yet become sufficiently disenchanted with the
old rules-or perhaps not sufficiently aware of the injustices they pro-
duce-to overturn an entire body of so-called "settled" law. W~hether
this results from inadequate advocacy and commentary or from judicial
conservatism-possibly aggravated by a fear of bankrupting con-
demnors 84 -need not be resolved here. The narrow theoretical ap-
proach of the evolving specialty theory can be utilized by courts to
provide payment for equipment and machinery that otherwise might
not be compensable. But why should not the courts or legislatures
confront the entire problem directly and redefine the old rules in terms
of modern economic theory rather than use the indirect techniques of
appraisal manipulation or the specialty theory?
IV
THE PROPER MEANS TO THE DESrRED RESULT:
AN ECONOMIC PARALLEL
The complexities of modern business have made traditional prop-
erty distinctions cumbersome and inappropriate in condemnation
cases. 85 Recent developments moving away from emphasis on a fixture
83 See also, e.g., Paper v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 287 F.2d 141,
142 (D.C. Cir. 1960), permitting valuation of a retail liquor store by a method which
included evidence "that by a custom of the trade particularly in the operation of a
liquor store, 2.2% of the gross income over a 4-year period would properly reflect the
fair market rental"; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 477, 106
N.W.2d 727, 739 (1960), holding testimony of business volume admissible; Mattydale
Shopping Center, Inc. v. State, 279 App. Div. 704, 108 N.Y.S.2d 832 (4th Dep't 1951),
modified on other grounds, 303 N.Y. 974, 106 N.E.2d 59 (1952), which is read by the
editors of 19 N.Y. JuL. Eminent Domain § 189, at 429 & n.17 (1961), as permitting the
intimation that "potential income to be derived from property if developed to its highest
and best use is an element in determining market value." But see the lengthy rebuttal of
this interpretation of Mattydale in 4 NicHoLs" EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 12.3121[3],
at 124-25, in which the editors conclude that Mattydale does not, under any interpreta-
tion, permit capitalization of future income.
84 See pp. 625, 647 infra.
85 At common law, the doctrine of eminent domain first found expression in the
sovereign exercise of the basic right to enter upon property in the defense of the realm.
George v. Consolidated Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 411, 89 A. 635 (1914). The development of
eminent domain in the United States differed from that in England. In both nations, the
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theory and toward a more economically oriented theory of going con-
cern or specialty operation are steps in the right direction. Nevertheless,
modern-day economic concepts reveal that these developments consti-
tute only partial solutions to the problem;-
Productive capital is simply a combination of the factors of pro-
duction, including land, buildings, machinery, workers, and good
will.86 Working together, these factors are worth more than the total
acquisition costs of the individual components. The "marginal effi-
ciency" of a machine is the ratio of its value in an integrated operation
divided by its market value.8 7 For example, assume that the cost of
borrowing money to buy a machine that produces widgets is six percent
per year and that the widget factory earns ten percent on invested
capital. The marginal efficiency of the widget machine is 1.67 (10/6).
Thus, the machine is worth 1.67 times its current market value when
used in combination with the other factors of production.
Yet, unless the widget machine is held to be a fixture, its loss may
growth of railroads prompted use of this "inherent and necessary right of sovereignty of
the state." Valentine v. Lamont, 13 N.J. 569, 575, 100 A.2d 668, 670 (1953). But in England
it was necessary to acquire highly developed industrial and commercial areas, instead of
the wilderness common to America at that time. As a result, English courts awarded
damages for incidental losses under a standard of "value to the owner." They further
increased this amount by 10% to compensate the condemnee for general inconvenience.
Comment, supra note 8, at 66.
Europe as a whole recognizes to a far greater extent than the United States that the
expense of relocation of condemnees is a public responsibility. European condemnation
awards dwarf American. GREBLER, URBAN RENEWAL IN EUROPEAN CouNTRIES: ITS EMERGENCE
AND POTENTIALS 84-85 (1964). Grebler points out that the difference in American and
European attitudes may be due to the "excessive urge of Americans to get things done
without bothering to consider the burdens falling upon individuals" and the American
willingness to accept mobility as a condition of life. Europeans, on the other hand,
consider leaving a long established business location a major tragedy. Id. at 87.
86 See generally W. CATLIN, THE PROGRESS OF ECONOMICS (1962).
87 John Maynard Keynes spelled out the theory of the marginal efficiency of the
factors of production in J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 185-46 (19M6. Modern economists no longer use the term "marginal efficiency" in
the same manner as Keynes and the authors, but there is little disagreement that the
concept has continuing validity. B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SEcuanTY ANALYSIS
(4th ed. 1962), discuss marginal efficiency in terms of "asset or book value" and "going
concern value." The difference between book value and sale price is accounted for by the
"efficiency" of the integrated operation. Id. at 217, 359. See also P. SAMUELSON & G. ACFJ.EY,
MACROECONOMIC THEORY 460-504 (1961).
Marginal efficiency is measured as follows. If we assume that the current rate of
interest is a proper measure of the efficiency of capital and also a factor in determining
how to use capital, then converting capital into factors of production is attractive until
the rate of return equals or is less than the current interest rate-i.e., until it would be
more profitable to lend capital to others than use it to produce a product or service..
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go uncompensated in eminent domain proceedings. Even if held to be
a fixture, the landowner may be improperly compensated, because the
market value of the land as enhanced by the machine, rather than the
marginal efficiency of the machine itself, is the standard of compen-
sation."" The marginal efficiency of each factor of production, however,
has been destroyed, because it is no longer being used in combination
with the other factors.
Apparently out courts do not consider marginal efficiency when
grappling with the problems of valuation. Instead, they strain for a
just and equitable result within the strictures of property law. In
many cases, they sense that compensation must be more than market
value, as when they take into consideration all the uses to which the
land might be put. 9  Tew York holds that property that is integrated
into the operation of a going business and that would lose substantially
all its value when separated from the land is in effect part of the land
(a fixture), even though it is essentially free-standing and removable
without damage to the land.90 Thus, our courts sense that, when factors
of production are used in combination to produce a product of service,
their value is increased. Unfortunately, marginal efficiency is not rec-
ognized as such and the theories used are inadequate for according full
compensation. Despite language of the courts to the effect that for
purposes of valuation a condemnation is viewed as a voluntary sale
between the state-buyer and the owner-seller, the truth is that a con-
demnation is a forced sale-the state buys at its own inadequate price.
These economic conclusions are complemented by several policy
considerations. The state reduces the economic base for any industry
when it fails to compensate for the marginal efficiency that is destroyed
by the taking of land, buildings, and fixtures. In effect, a part of the
profit potential is lost. A business may be able to recreate its marginal
efficiency at a new location, but doing so is never certain. At least its
cost of relocating and its ability to recreate its original marginal effi-
ciency ought to be considered in determining to what extent there is a
taking of marginal efficiency.
Encouraging industry is in the public interest; not only the busi-
88 The unfairness of this approach is revealed in the analysis of fixtures at pp.
607-14 supra.
89 See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 408 (1878); Teele v. Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N.E.
506 (1896); City of Cleveland v. Langenau Mfg. Co., 159 Ohio St. 525, 530, 112 N.E.2d 658,
660 (1953); 80 CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 446, at 607-08 (1965).
90 In re City of New York (Seward Park Slum Clearance Project), 10 App. Div. 2d
498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802 (ist Dep't 1960); In re City of New York (North River Water Front),
118 App. Div. 865, 108 N.Y. Supp. 908 (1st Dep't 1907).
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nessman but also society as a whole suffers when losses are left with the
individual.91 The plight of the individual businessman is all the more
compelling, since the rationale for these takings involves no undesirable
private conduct as in nuisance cases.92 Rather, the public is enriched
through public use of the land, and the cost should be apportioned
among citizens generally. 93 The oft-repeated complaint that full com-
pensation might bankrupt governmental authorities is not very im-
pressive, Given the social cost of injury to business from inadequate
compensation, it would probably be cheaper in the long run for society
to distribute the cost through the tax structure to those who benefit
from the taking.9 4
Naturally, redistribution of actual costs may not lend itself to
mathematical precision, because both the actual value of property
taken and the particular group or member of the public benefited are
not exactly determinable. Nonetheless, an attempt at such reapportion-
ment, however imperfect, should be undertaken.9 5 Ideally, the owner
should be entitled to the full value of the property taken, i.e., market
value and marginal efficiency of unrelocatable property, plus the dimi-
nution in marginal efficiency of property retained by the owner.
91 President Johnson recognized the problem and urged reforms concerning the
human costs of displacement in the urban renewal context during his 1964 Housing
Message: "Similarly, small business men . . . often incur economic loss and hardship as
a result of displacement by urban renewal or public housing which is not offset by
current compensation practices and moving expense reimbursements." 110 CONe. REC.
1047 (1964). See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 00 HAav. L, REv. 1165, 1171-7g (1967).
92 Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899) (nonconforming sse
found to be undesirable private conduct); State v. Sportmen's Club, 214 Minn. 151, 7
N.W.2d 495 (1943) (gaming and use as a tavern found to be undesirable private conduct);
Black v. Circuit Court, 78 S.D. 802, 101 N.W.2d 520 (1960) (house of prostitution as a
nuisance).
93 There is no reason why a man whose land is taken for a public improvement
should be made to contribute more for the public and common benefit than his
neighbor, whose lands are not taken but who is equafly benefited by the improve-
ment.
Ridgewood v. Sreel Inv. Corp., 28 N.J. 121, 181-32, 145 A.2d 806, 313 (1958). See generally
U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREAT-
MENT OF PEOPLE AND BusNEssEs DIsPLAcED BY GOVERNMENTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as
ADVISORY COMM'N]; Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLUM.
L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy gsnd Concept,
42 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 609 (1954).
94 Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939); Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in
Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REv. 432, 452-54 (1962).
95 See generally Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964).
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V
GOOD WILL: A NECESSARY ExcuRsION INTO THE
VALUATION THICKET
Good will compensation problems parallel those of marginal effi-
ciency. What follows is not intended to be an extensive analysis of
public policy considerations relevant to the compensability of good
will. Rather, the concern is to dispel old myths and approach a proper
definition of value and business losses. The result is a pragmatic case
for compensation of all or part of the good will of a business.
The similarity of the good will concept to what Keynesian econo-
mists have labelled "value in use," or the marginal efficiency of capital,
is illustrated by Judge Swan's statement in Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Co. v. Clarke:96
A going business has a value over and above the aggregate value of
the tangible property employed in it. Such excess of value is nothing
more than the recognition that, used in an established business
that has won the favor of its customers, the tangibles may be ex-
pected to earn in the future as they have in the past. The owner's
privilege of so using them, and his privilege of continuing to deal
with customers attracted by the established business, are property
of value. This latter privilege is known as good will.97
Judge Swan's definition measures good will in terms of an "excess of
value" over and above the market value of the tangible property em-
ployed in the business. The indicator of good will is favorable customer
relations, and the specific value to the owner is the privilege of main-
taining all factors unchanged. This analysis, however, focuses on the
end product, good will, and it leaves unidentified the factors that give
rise to and sustain good will. Accounting texts formulate these factors
as follows:
[S]ince good will is dependent upon earnings, and since many
things other than customer satisfaction contribute to earnings,
there are many sources of goodwill. Some of these sources are: loca-
tion; manufacturing efficiency; satisfactory relations between the
employees and the management . . .; adequate sources of capital
and a credit standing . . .; advertising; monopolistic privileges;
and, in general, good business management. 98
96 .30 F.2d 219.(2d Cir, 1929),.rev'd on other grounds, 280.U.S. 384 (1930).
97 -Id. at 221-22. This formulation is analyzed in depth -in Comment, An Inquiry
into the Nature of Good Will, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660 (1953).
98 H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 216-17 (6th ed. 1963). See also
People ex rel. A.J. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N.Y. 70, 83, N.E. 685, 689 (1899), and
Justice Story's famous definition in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S.
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To the extent that good will is dependent upon location and
customer regularity incidental thereto, its value would be included as
a part of the composite price that the property would bring in a private
sale. 9 Judge Cardozo observed:
Men will pay for any privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy
of preference in the race of competition .... Such expectancy may
come from succession in place or name or otherwise to a business
that has won the favor of its customers. It is then known as good
will.100
The question remaining is whether good will, at least insofar as pro-
duced by locational factors, is similarly important to the computation
of the "forced" sale price of a business after a condemnation or appro-
priation.
A. Valuation Problems
Upon condemnation of a parcel of land, the owner is generally
entitled to compensation in terms of the highest and best use to which
the land could be put.1 1 The measure of damages is the market value
of the land on a hypothetical open market in which willing buyers and
willing sellers deal at arm's length and without compulsion. 10 2 Never-
theless, the courts do not feel compelled to compensate for injury to
either the going concern value or the good will of a business.10 3 1(
436, 446 (1893). Although locational factors and incidental customer regularity are of
great importance in the establishment and continuation of good will, some courts have
completely discounted them and rather have emphasized the "business name" as the crucial
factor. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1940).
09 The validity of this statement is demonstrated in the governmental context by
the disappearance or liquidation of businesses in urban renewal areas. The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations points out that 35.3% of displaced busi-
nesses discontinued operations. ADvisoRY COMM'N, supra note 93, at 53. This is, of course,
significantly above the normal rate of business liquidations. A primary factor for this
large discontinuance rate was found to be "[t]he inability of many small (one or two
person) tenant businesses to transfer their 'good will' to a relocation site .... " Id. at 54.
The locational aspect of good will has been given constitutional protection. E.g.,
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1925). See generally Housing Authority
v. Lustig, 139 Conn. 73, 76-77, 90 A.2d 169, 171 (1952).
100 In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926).
101 E.g., St. Agnes Cemetery v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 37, 143 N.E.2d 377, 163 N.Y.S.2d 655
(1957); Sparkill Realty Corp. v. State, 254 App. Div. 78, 4 N.Y.S.2d 679 (3d Dep't), afJ'd,
279 N.Y. 656, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938); see United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
102 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 24, § 20; see also G. Scsurrz, supra note 49, ch. 1.
103 Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
817 (1960); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 688, cert. denied, 269 U.S.
582 (1925); In re Huie, 7 App. Div. 2d 24, 180 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3d Dep't 1958); Humbert v.
State, 278 App. Div. 1041, 107 N.Y.S.2d 507 (4th Dep't 1951), af'd, 303 N.Y. 929, 105 N.E.2d
504 (1952).
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The rationale behind the noncompensability of these items is that
an appropriation of land makes the state liable to compensate only for
the taking of land itself and any buildings and fixtures appurtenant
thereto.10 4 The loss of good will and going concern value are viewed
merely as the incidental loss of noncompensable intangibles. That the
owner may lose his customers and favorable materials markets and may
be unable to regain his position in the business community at a dif-
ferent location has been held to be irrelevant.10 5 Damage to good will
is held noncompensable on the ground that it is too speculative a loss.
Alternatively, the courts argue that good will is attached to the busi-
ness name and the proprietor rather than the location of the business
and therefore is not seriously damaged by condemnation.1 6 This prop-
osition, of course, is contrary to the economic analysis of the factors
contributing to good will. In addition, to deny compensation because
of the so-called "speculative" nature of good will is contrary to the
thrust of private law.10 7 Good will can be the subject of a testamentary
bequest or a private sale, 08 and it is generally a valued asset of a
partnership devisable on the dissolution of the partnership.109 Good
Loss of "going concern value" and any good will included therein is, however, com-
pensable upon the taking of a public utility where the condemnor intends to continue
the operation. The theory is that such a taking includes both the land and business,
whereas the ordinary taking of business property without continued operation by the
condemnor is a taking of the land only. See 2 L. ORGEL, supra note 24, ch. XIX. But see
City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 202 (1910), stating that good will is not
an element of value in operating public utilities insofar as such enterprises ordinarily are
monopolistic and hold their customers by compulsion rather than choice. The rule of
compensation for "going concern value" has even been extended to an admittedly un-
profitable public utility, where the reason for unprofitability was unreasonable rate
regulation. See In re City of New York (Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc.), 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219
N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1966); Note, Going Concern Value in Condemnation of Un-
profitable Public Utilities, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 72 (1967). In an apparent misunderstanding of
the going concern rule, the New York Court of Appeals awarded a bankrupt commuter
facility the going concern value to the condemnor rather than the going concern value to
the condemnee. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., 20
N.Y.2d 457, 231 N.E.2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3382 (Apr. 1,
1968).
104 Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925) (going concern value not com-
pensable); Matter of Jeffries Home Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 651, 11 N.W.2d 272, 276
(1943) (good will not compensable). But see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1 (1948) (diminution in going concern value resulting from a "temporary" taking
compensable). Kimball is discussed in I L. ORGEL., supra note 24, § $0, at 344-50.
105 See cases cited note 136 infrg.
106 See the discussion and cases cited in 1 L. QRPGL, supra note 24, § 76.
107 See generally 4 NICUOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 13.31, at 452-57.
108 See generally In re Whalen, 41 Misc. 2d 825, 246 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sur. Ct. 1963);
Comment, supra note 97; Annot., 7 AL.R. 1365 (1920).
109 In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926); Crane, Partnership Good Will, 18
VA. L. R v. 651, 656 (1932).
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will is an element in corporate accounting and is a taxable item for
purposes of both estate and income tax.110 In addition, it can be both an
asset subject to the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy,"' and property
within the meaning of a statute regulating the issuance of corporate
shares.112 Thus, in many areas the courts have not hesitated to place
a value on good will.
All of the generally accepted formulas for estimating the dollars-
and-cents value of good will in private law turn on the amount of
future excess profits.113 The first step is to determine the average annual
earnings of the business, usually by reviewing earnings over a period
of from two to six representative years. To insure that the record of
past earnings is representative, the years selected should include both
years of prosperity and years of decline, and allowances should be made
for any overstatements in earnings through inadequate depreciation or
salary allowances or changes in wage and tax rates.
Once a representative record of past earnings is determined, at
least two formulas can be used to estimate the value of good will.114 In
the first, the income return from a capital investment is determined,
six percent being used as the normal rate. This figure, reflecting the
normal profit for the investment, is then deducted from the average
net earnings. The resulting figure is called the "average excess profits,"
which is then multiplied by the number of years' excess profits that an
ordinarily prudent purchaser would be willing to pay for in order to
acquire the good will. The product is the salable value of the good will.
Selection of the number of years for this multiplier is dependent upon
circumstances determining the probability of continued future excess
earnings, three to five years generally being considered average.
110 E.g., Kripke, A Good Look at Goodwill in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 BANKING
L.J. 1028 (1961); Weiss, The Takc Tredtment of a Disposition of Professional Goodwill,
73 YALE L.J. 1158 (1964).
ll Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 813 U.S.
578 (1941); Thomas Day Co. v. King, 42 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1930); Freeman v. Freeman, 86
App. Div. 110, 85 N.Y.S. 478 (4th Dep't 1903), 4 NicHoLs' EMINENT DOtAN, supra note 3,
§ 13.31, at 456-57.
112 Washburn v. National Wall-Paper Co., 81 F. 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1897).
113 The two formulas to be discussed in the text are substantially the same as those
in H. FINNEY & H. MmILzE, supra note 98, at 217-18. For an example of a formula given
judicial approval for estatd tax purposes, see In re Estate of Whalen, 41 Misc. 2d 825, 829,
246 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531-32 (Suf. Ct. 1963),
114 The question may arisd how these formulas compare with those used to compute
marginal efficiency discussed at pp. 622-25 & notes 87-95 supra, The value of good will is
a component of the value of marginal efficiency, which is the value of the excess the
factors of production working together return over and above the return from capital at
the current rate of interest. Thus, good will contributes to the ability of capital to generate
a profit, which is marginal efficiency.
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A second common method involves averaging the net earnings of
the business over a period of time, generally not less -than five years.
Usually from eight to ten percent of the average net earnings, depend-
ing on the nature of the business and the risks involved, is then taken
as an allowance on the average of net tangible assets. The allowance is
deducted from the average net earnings to arrive at an excess attribut-
able to intangible assets, which is then capitalized at a fixed rate be-
tween ten and twenty percent, again depending on the character of the
business and the risks involved.
Both of the foregoing formulas are subject to revision when the
good will element depends principally on the personal efforts of an
individual, as in the case of a physician or lawyer.115 In such case, the
good will element does not inhere in the location or the component
parts of the business. Nevertheless, in the ordinary appropriation cases,
in which the human or personal element is only one of many factors,
the foregoing formulas could be utilized to put a dollar-and-cents
figure on good will. If necessary, the personal, nontransferable element
could then be eliminated by using a percentage deduction.
Thus, the reluctance of the courts to compensate for good will is
based on policy and not the speculative nature of the valuation process.
This is confirmed by noting the many areas of the law in which recovery
for damage to good will is granted even though speculative." 6 More-
over, market value, the basic measure of damages in condemnation
suits, is not necessarily an easily determinable, objective fact, although
the courts persist in treating it that way.117
115 See, e.g., In re Case, 122 App. Div. 343, 106 N.Y.S. 1086 (3d Dep't 1907); In re
Bluestein, 197 Misc. 616, 95 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sur. Ct.), modified on other grounds,
277 App. Div. 385, 100 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 760, 98 N.E.2d 886
(1951); Coffey v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 160 Misc. 186, 189, 289 N.Y.S. 882, 886 (Sup.
Ct. 1986). But see J. MAcNEILL, ACCOUNTING PRACTICE MANAGEMENT HANDBOoK 473 (1962)
(stating that there is no goodwill in a personal service partnership); Caufield, How Can
Professionals Establish Goodwill in the Sale of Their Practices, 23 J. TAXATION 268 (1965).
116 See, e.g., Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in Unfair Competition Cases,
31 CORNEL L.Q. 431 (1946); Wright, Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Good Will,
14 CORNELL L.Q. 298 (1929).
117 For striking examples of how divergent the estimates of many expert witnesses
are concerning market value in particular takings, see State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel,
203 Md. 619, 625-26, 102 A.2d 563, 566 (1954) ($2,000 as against $54,348); In re Civic
Center, 335 Mich. 528, 531-32, 56 N.W.2d 375 376 (1953) ($300,000 as against $600,000);
Oklahoma City v. Wilson, 310 P.2d 369, 372 (Okla. 1957) ($4,200 as against S42,400); Tulsa
County Drainage Dist. v. Stroud, 198 Okla. 688, 181 P.2d 1000 (1947) ($600 as against
$30,000); Reeves v. City of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 580 (rex. Civ. App. 1946) ($20,000 as
against $100,000). See also United States v. 37.15 Acres of Land, 77 F. Supp. 798, 800-01
(S.D. Cal. 1948); Dolan, New Federal Procedure in Condemnation Actions, 39 VA. L. REv.
1071, 1077 (1953).
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B. The Criterion of Constitutionality
Failure to compensate -for good will has been jistfid by coh-
stitutional arguments. It is said that neither the business nor its good
will is actually taken, but only the land itself.'*" Thus, going concern
value and good will supposedly are not "property" within the contem-
plation of the eminent domain clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.
This view, in effect, assumes that just compensation is an in rem
rather than an in personam right, 09 a limitation neither expressly nor
impliedly present in the Federal Constitution. The Constitution speaks
of the taking of private property for public use, and conditions the
taking upon the payment of just compensation. "Property" is rarely
defined in any constitution, federal or state. Although the draftsmen
of the original constitutions may have had a limited, eighteenth century
conception of property, inclusion of the term could not have been
intended to freeze the concept for all time. The courts themselves have
never adhered to so limited an interpretation of this constitutional
provision. The federal provision and most of the state provisions are
generally found in the Bill of Rights. Such sections were designed to
protect individuals and their property against arbitrary actions of
the state, such as uncompensated appropriation of valuable items.
Clearly, property rights are an aspect of an individual's rights; the
Constitution deals "with persons, not with tracts of land."' 20 Good
will, admittedly intangible, has been specifically designated as property
in private law.' 12 Why is this concept not transposed to the law of
eminent domain?
Supporters of the view that good will is not property within the
meaning of the Constitution further reason that, since all property is
owned subject to an implied condition that it be surrendered when-
ever the public interest requires, any expense or inconvenience inci-
dental to the surrender of possession on a taking is not a compensable
118 United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282 (1943). The basis for
this argument is that the interests taken are not property vis-Lt-vis the government.
119 The classic statement of this view is in Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). It has been explicitly followed in United States v. Building
Known As 651 Brannan St., 55 F. Supp. 667, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1944); State Highway Comm'n
v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 244-45, 265 P.2d 783, 789 (1954). See also A.W. Duckett & Co. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924); United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352-53
(1892).
120 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
121 See, e.g., Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), recog-
nizing good will as property but disallowing an income tax deduction for loss of good will,
principally on the ground of statutory construction.
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damage. 122 In addition to its lack of constitutional basis, this proposi-
tion suffers from both a misunderstanding of the component elements
of good wil'2 and an unwarranted emphasis on what might be termed
a "physical" conception of taking.124 Moreover, even if it is concluded
that property is held subject to an implied condition that it be sur-
rendered when the public interest so demands, a second, and perhaps
more important, condition is that property be surrendered for public
use only upon the payment of just compensation.
The physical concept of taking, of course, has been considerably
undermined by the airport overflight cases decided under the Federal
Constitution.12 5 In those cases, ownership of the land remained in the
property owners, but the use of the land was severely impaired by the
noise and vibrations incidental to the normal operation of adjoining
airports. Evidence showed loss of property value. Property damage and
business losses were held to be compensable. Also, many cases have
turned on the related "constructive taking" theory.126 Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon127 held that police power regulation can be so severe
as to constitute a taking resulting in compensable damage, despite the
lack of an actual physical taking.28
The last theory supporting the no-compensation rule is centered
on the previously discussed notion that the Constitution does not
mandate compensation for the taking of purely personal property,
since such property can be removed from the condemned or appro-
122 4 NIcHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, §§ 13.3, 13.31, at 433, 452.
128 See pp. 627-30 supra, discussing the component elements of good will dand
analyzing the importance of "locational" factors.
124 See Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101, 114-15 (Pa. 1843), containing
a classic statement of the "physical" concept of taking. See also the discussions in A. JAHR,
supra note 56, § 51, at 73-74, Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
YALE L.J. 221, 223-24 (1931).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 US. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retro-
spect and Prospect, 71 Dic. L. REv. 207 (1967). But see Batten v. United States, 306
F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955.
126 The modem and prevailing view is that any substantial interference with
private property which destroys or lessens itg Value, Or by which the owner's
right to its use or enjoyment is in afty substahtiai degree abridged or destroyed,
is) in fact and in law, a "taking" in the constitutional sense, to the extent of the
damages suffered, even though the title and possession of the owner remains
undisturbed.
2 NIcHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 6.3, at 407.
127 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
128 See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ, 36 (1964); Mayberry
& Aloi, Compensation for Loss of Access in Eminent Domain in New York: A Re-
evaluation of the No-Compensation Rule with a Proposal for Change, 16 BurFF. L. REv.
603, 624-30 (1967).
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priated property and used again on another site by the owner. The
argument proceeds that there is even less reason for compensating for
the loss of intangible personal property resulting from the change in
location of the business.12 9 Personal property, however, may be com-
pensable when used in a specialty operation; the locational aspect of
good will is, in fact, taken by an appropriation; and through manipu
lation of appraisal techniques, courts have apparently been compensat-
ing for such losses.' 30
C. The Standard of Market Value
Though reference may be made to real or imagined constitutional
limitations and occasionally to the speculative nature of good will, the
real basis for the no-compensation rule seems to be an unwillingness
or inability of courts to use true market value as the standard of com-
pensation. In R.J. Widen Co. v. United States,131 the United States
Court of Claims stated:
It is settled law that in the absence of specific statutory man-
date, compensation under the Fifth Amendment may be recovered
only for property taken and not for incidental or consequential
losses, the rationale being that the sovereign need only pay for
what it actually takes rather than for all that the owner has lost....
Hence the incidental spoilation of plaintiff's inventory and equip-
ment, the reduction or loss of its good will and profits, and the
expenses incurred in having to re-adjust its manufacturing opera-
dons are non-compensable under long-established legal princi-
ples.132
Quoting United States v. General Motors Corp.,33 the Widen court
continued:
The sovereign ordinarily takes the fee. The rule in such a case
is that compensation for that interest does not include future loss
of profits, the expense of moving removable fixtures and personal
property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in
the location of the land, or other like consequential losses which
would ensue the sale of the property to someone other than the
sovereign. No doubt all these elements would be considered by an
owner in determining whether, and at what price, to sell. No
doubt, therefore, if the owner is to be made whole for the loss con-
sequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements
should properly be considered. But the courts have generally held
129 See Gauley & E. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290 (1919).
130 See pp. 627-30 & notes 101-17 supra.
131 357 F.2d 988 (Ct. C1. 1966).
132 Id. at 994.
'33 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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that they are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation for the
fee taken by the Government. 13 4
This language reveals that the Widen court was troubled with its
analysis of the noncompensability of good will and other losses inci-
dental to the fee-taking. To justify its analysis, the court quoted in a
footnote the following language from United States v. Petty Motor
Co.: 
1 3 5
"[I]t has come to be recognized that just compensation is the value
of the interest taken. This is not the value to the owner for his
particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use but
so-called 'market value.' It is recognized that an owner often re-
ceives less than the value of the property to him but experience has
shown that the rule is reasonably satisfactory. Since 'market value'
does not fluctuate with the needs of the condemnor or condemnee
but with the general demand for the property, evidence of loss of
profits, damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other
such consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation
proceedings."' 13 6
The courts frequently emphasize that the Constitution and special
statutes do not mandate compensation based upon any special value
of the property to the owner.'3 7 The inference is drawn that good will
is a special value to the owner, is nontransferable, and, accordingly,
noncompensable.' 31 Good will, however, comprehends far more than
merely personal values instilled in a business by the owner, especially
in businesses not dealing in personal services. Locational factors and
incidental customer regularity cannot be discounted. Just compensa-
tion in eminent domain proceedings should be based upon what the
owner lost, not what the condemnor gained or received. Special value
to the owner should not be compensable, but the key factor should be
what the owner lost as measured by a true, rather than an arbitrarily
qualified, market value. In the words of the Supreme Court:
[T]he value of the property to the Government for its particular
use is not a criterion. The owner must be compensated for what
is taken from him, but that is done when he is paid its fair market
value for all available uses and purposes.13 9
134 857 F.2d at 994, quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 328 U.S. 878,
379 (1945) (emphasis added).
135 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
136 357 F.2d at 994 n.Il, quoting United States v. Petty Motor Co., 827 U.S. 872,
377-78 (1946). See-also Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1928); Bothwell
v. United States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920)
137 See, e.g., 2 J. LEvis, EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNIm STATM § 706 (3d ed. 1909).
138 See 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 24, § 75.
139 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 58, 81 (1913).
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The question, of course, is whether utilization of the standard of
market value for some reason precludes compensation: for going con-
cern value and good will.
Each of the major treatises on eminertt domain contains a rather
lengthy section defining and qualifying the term market value.140 The
definition by Nichols is characteristic:
By fair market value is meant the amount of money which a pur-
chaser willing but not obliged to buy the property would pay to
an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into considera-
tion all uses to which the land was adapted and might in reason be
applied.' 4'
In arriving at the market value of the property as actually used, or at
its highest and best use, if different, it is improper to value the com-
ponent elements separately and then add them. Rather, an aggregate
evaluation of all the property integrated into the use in question must
be made. 42 As we have seen, however, the courts have made a number
of arbitrary assumptions and exclusions contrary to the hypothetical
open market standard of valuation. Although a separate price tag is
never placed on each component part of the business in a private sale
with certain items being discounted as speculative in nature or personal
to the seller and therefore nontransferable, this is precisely what the
federal government or the states and municipalities do when they
assume the position of a "strong arm" buyer in eminent domain. The
governmental authority invokes the concept of the hypothetical open
market to deny an owner compensation for the unique value the pre-
mises hold for him, but emasculates that concept when confronted with
the problem of compensating for the taking of a going business.
Whereas the locational aspects of good will are physically taken,
other component elements, such as managerial skill, are not. Never-
theless, these elements are damaged by the taking. The finding of an
actual taking of business property cannot turn solely on whether the
condemnor intends to continue the business in operation. Nor should
the possibility that the owner may subsequently relocate his business
and again develop a profitable operation have any real bearing on
determining whether there has in the first instance been a taking. The
140 E.g., 2 J. LEwis, supra note 137; 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 24, § 20, at 90-96; G.
SCHhUi, suPra note 49, ch. 1.
141 4 NicHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 12.2[l, at 48-54. See id. § 12.2[3],
at 64.
142 4 NicHoLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 13.1211]. This "unit rule" has been
followed in, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948); Banner
Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 688 (1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1924).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
taking unquestionably destroys or interrupts the operation of the phys-
ical plant. At best the result is a forced hiatus during which managerial
skill or business acumen, divorced from the other factors of production,
must remain sterile and unproductive. Even when relocation is pos-
sible, good will as manifested in managerial skill has been so severely
interfered with that, in effect, it has at least temporarily been taken.
The owner has no assurance after the taking that he can again combine
all the factors of production into his previously efficient and profitable
operation. Thus, the owner should be entitled to prove and to be
compensated for the difference, if any, in the value of his business good
will before and after the taking. On the other hand, perhaps the state
should be permitted to prove renewed profitable operation in mitiga-
tion. To this end, the prosecution of that portion of the owner's suit
perhaps could be delayed until a year after the taking.
A revision of the no-compensation-for-good-will rule is dearly war-
ranted. Utilization of the specialty concept or masking economically
sound, though legally suspect, awards through adroit manipulation of
appraisal techniques are, as we have seen, two limited judicial responses
to the problem. But these measures, however well intentioned, are
inevitably imprecise, subject to varying application by different courts,
and, in fact, incapable of placing proper economic values on the
totality of factors identified as the marginal efficiency of capital.
Further, judicially initiated change seems impossible, since most courts
are unwilling or unable to overturn the substantial body of precedent
to the contrary. Legislative or constitutional change may be the only
means of redressing the inequities common to the present compensa-
tion scheme.
VI
BREAKING THE JUDICIAL IMPASSE THROUGH REMEDIAL
LEGISLATIVE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
A. Remedial Legislation
Legislative change may permit an otherwise impossible fresh
examination of the problem of compensation for business losses and
therefore a more rational choice of values. The legislature has greater
freedom than the courts to analyze all aspects of the problem through
its committee system, powers of investigation, and law revision com-
missions. Several statutes currently in force and at least one proposed
statute provide alternative approaches.
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One approach is exemplified by the Administrative Code of the
City of New York, which provides that:
The owner ... of any established business... directly or indirectly
decreased in value by reason of the acquiring of land by the city
for an additional water supply or by reason of the execution of any
plans for such additional water supply by the city... shall have a
right to damages for such decrease in value.143
This statute focuses on the effect of the governmental action upon the
business. Whether by legislative intent or otherwise, the generality of
the language required judicial interpretation; and an examination of
the cases construing it provides some insight into its usefulness as a
model for a statute creating a general right of compensation for
business losses.
The first case was People ex rel. Burhans v, City of New York,144
in which the city contended that the statute extended only to losses
suffered by businesses located on lands adjoining the condemned land
and not to businesses actually located on the condemned parcel. Re-
jecting this contention, the court commented that "[n]either the lan-
guage nor the purpose of the statute indicate that the Legislature in-
tended to accomplish such an incongruous and unjust result.'1 45
The question of the methods and limits on proof of business
losses under this provision was raised four years later in In re Boqrd
of Water Supply. 46 Stating that "the commission shall not be limited
143 N.Y. Crry ADmIN. CODE § K51-44.0(a) (1963) (formerly N.Y. City Water Supply
Act § 42, as amended, L. 1928 ch. 525, § 7) (emphasis added). For a modern comment on
the scope of the statute, see In re Huie (Liddle), 14 App. Div. 2d 613, 218 N.Y.S.2d 370,
371 (3d Dep't 1961), appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.gd 486, 188 N.E.2d 263, 937 N.Y.S.2d 997
(1963), stating that business losses resulting from a water supply .ondemnation for New
York City are compensable even if "resulting indirectly from acquisition." For a typical
example of the common law view, see Schriebman v. State, 31 Misc, 2d 392, 223 N.Y.S.2d
670 (Ct. C1. 1961), where upon the condemnation of approximately one-third of the
acreage of an egg farm, the condemnee sought recovery for losses allegedly resulting from
the termination of valuable contracts to supply eggs to a large grocery chain and of an
advantageous contract for the purchase of feed. The court held, in the absence of a
statute, that there could be no recovery since "the State did not appropriate the contract
with either company .... The claimant cannot recover for their loss, nor can he be
compensated for the loss of business . .. nor may we consider net profits." Id. at 394,
223 N.YS.2d at 674.
With respect to the so-called water supply condemnation sttutes, see generally 1
L. ORGEL, supra note 24, § 79. For a collectil(r of various statutory :esponises to the
problem, see 2 NicHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, §§ 6.41-.43.
144 198 N.Y. 439, 92 N.E. 18 (1910),
145 Id. at 447, 92 N.E. at 20.
146 211 N.Y. 174, 105 N.E. 213 (1914).
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in the reception of evidence to the rules regulating the proof of direct
damages,"'147 the court set the following guidelines:
Where an established business is decreased in value without being
wholly destroyed, the best evidence procurable to show the decrease
must be produced. When . . . the decrease amounts to a total
destruction of the business at the place where it has been con-
ducted, it is essential in showing its value to ascertain the profit
that was derived from it.148
Significantly, the court also eliminated any set-off attributable to re-
location profits. 149 Apparently the court refused to promulgate specific
limitations on this statutory power to compensate for business losses.
Rather, the limitations, if any, were placed under the overworked um-
brella of "speculative" damages. 50
The language of the statute is liberal both in its assumption of
liability and in its delineation of the range of compensable damage.
Precise refinement is left to case-by-case construction by the courts.
Generally, this approach has worked, and perhaps this alone suffices to
recommend it. All manners of proof on the direct or indirect decrease
in the value of a business are admissible, subject only to the limitation
that speculative losses will not be considered. For our purposes, the
phrase "directly or indirectly decreased in value" certainly would
comprehend losses to good will, and, in any event, awards based on
capitalization of net profits necessarily would include good will. The
fear of astronomical costs eventually bankrupting condemnors can
perhaps be allayed by including a provision permitting the condemnor
to introduce evidence of relocation and renewed profitable operation.
The theory would be that only loss of actual profits incident to the
business interruption together with the cost of relocation should con-
stitute damages rather than a general capitalization of net profits.151
147 Id. at 185, 105 N.E. at 216.
148 Id. at 185, 105 N.E. at 217 (emphasis added).
149 If a person making a claim for decrease in the value of an established busi-
ness is fortunate in developing a business at another place or obtaining favor-
able employment it cannot be used to mitigate or lessen the damages for which
the city ... is liable. A claim for such damages should be ascertained as of the
date when the established business is taken or decreased.
Id. at 186, 105 N.E. at 217.
150 "[T]he damages allowed should . . . be real, and not speculative or merely
fanciful .... It is not the purpose of the statute to give gifts or grant pensions." Id. at
185, 105 N.E. at 216-17. Subsequent cases have refined the guidelines set by In re Board of
Watbi" Suipply. See, e.g., !n re Huie (White), 13 App. Div. 2d 596, 597, 212 N.Y.S.2d 925,
927 (3d Dep't 1961).
151 2 LEwis, supra note 137, § 820, argues that the ascertainment of damage and pay-
ment of compensation for such damage resulting from the taking should be left open for
adjudication until after the taking and construction of the public improvements. The
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Alternatively, a maximum ceiling on the amount of recoverable dam-
ages might be set, as one commentator suggests, at ten times the average
net earnings of the business. 152 Other problems of construction of the
water supply statute might be eliminated by codifying some of the
holdings that have interpreted it. For example, a statutory presumption
placing a business within the coverage of the statute might arise
whenever a business has been in operation for five years preceding the
filing of plans or the entry of a judgment condemning the property.
Inclusion of businesses in operation for less than five years could then
be left to the sound discretion of the courts. Also, a provision might
be included making clear that the statute covers losses, both direct and
indirect, caused by displacement of clientele,153 even if the physical
plant is not disturbed. No doubt further refinements will be developed
by legislative hearings or law revision commission studies.
An alternative to a general statute is narrow remedial legislation
similar to that passed in Pennsylvania and New York dealing with
condemnations for highway construction. The Pennsylvania statute
provides that "just compensation" shall consist of fair market value
of the real property taken plus other specified damages, including:
(1) reasonable expenses of removal, transportation, and reinstallation of
machinery, equipment, or fixtures, not to exceed $25,000 and in no
case to exceed market value; (2) business dislocation damages, where
it is shown that the business cannot be relocated without substantial loss
of clientele; compensation in such a case is the monthly rental multi-
plied by the number of months remaining in the lease, not to exceed
two years, with a maximum payment of $5,000 and a minimum of $250;
and (3) moving expenses for personal property other than machinery,
equipment, or fixtures, not to exceed $500 for residential and $25,000
for business moves, and in no case to exceed the market value of the
personal property.154 This statute is at best a limited response to the
problem and suffers from two basic shortcomings. First, many injustices
may be caused by the specific dollar limitations. Second, the statute is
unduly restrictive, since it does not purport to provide compensation
for general losses to going concern value or good will. In any event,
underlying rationale for this delay apparently is that courts will then be better able
to base awards on actual damage rather than upon present and capitalized future losses.
But see In re Bensel (Baker), 151 App. Div. 451, 453-54, 135 N.Y.S. 915, 917 (2d Dep't
19J2).152 Note, An Act To Provide Compensation for Loss of Goodwill Resulting from
Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 HARv. J. LEGis. 445, 446, 463 (1966).
153 This is the position taken in § 101(b) of the act proposed in id. at 445.
154 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-601 to 1-610 (Supp. 1966).
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business dislocation or relocation losses caused by condemnations other
than for highway purposes are not covered.
New York's remedial statutes have the limited objective of ex-
tending compensation for certain losses resulting from deprivation of
access caused by highway construction' 55 or grade crossing elimina-
tions.1 6 They have not been extended, expressly or by interpretation,
to the problem of business dislocation or relocation losses, going con-
cern value, or good will. In addition, some of the losses arguably within
the coverage of these statutes have remained noncompensable because
of ambiguous statutory language and narrow judicial interpretations.157
Apparently both the legislature and the courts have been confused
as to whether the New York statutes assumed additional liability or
merely expanded state or municipal power of condemnation for high-
way purposes.
While the Pennsylvania and New York experiences have produced
somewhat different problems, it should be clear that limited legislation
-i.e., for highways, urban renewal, water supply, etc.-fails to isolate
and solve the particular compensation problem and tends rather to
result in a multiplicity of vague, overlapping legislation. If the narrow
remedial legislation approach is to be of use, the statute must focus
directly on the particular elements of loss sought to be redressed, rather
than upon the purposes for which the condemnation proceeding is
instituted.
A statute modeled on the New York City water supply ordinance
might be enacted to compensate for business losses generally, with
specific emphasis upon manufacturing establishments and wholesale
operations. A separate statute might be passed covering retail businesses
or other enterprises that sell directly to the public. A model statute
of this type has been proposed in the Harvard Journal on Legislation.5 8
Specifically directed at damages resulting from loss of good will, the
model statute would compensate for business losses resulting from the
taking of the business location and/or the displacement of a regular
clientele 5 9 Before damages will be awarded, the claimant must prove
(1) "that prior to the taking a major portion of its income came, and
was expected to continue to come, from its regular clientele;" (2) "that
155 N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 197 (McKinney 1962); N.Y. SECOND CLASS CrrTS LAW § 99
(McKinney 1952); N.Y. VMLAGE LAW § 159 (McKinney 1966).
156 See, e.g., Buffalo Grade Crossing Elimination Act, ch. 576, § 12, [1916] N.Y. Laws
1932.
157 See Mayberry & Aloi, supra note 128, at 614-19.
168 Note, supra note 152, at 445-47.
159 Id. at 445 (§ 201).
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the regular clientele will not continue to patronize the injured business
as a direct result of the taking of the business location" and/or
the scattering or displacement of the regular clientele; and (3) "that
the injured business cannot serve the regular clientele from the same
or a new location without a decrease in profits."1 60 Where these con-
ditions are met, claimant is entitled upon the permanent discontinu-
ance of the business to the "expected future earnings" of the business
"capitalized at the judgment rate of interest less the actual sale value of
the assets of the business.' 61 If the business is continued, claimant may
recover damages equal to
the expected future earnings of the injured business capitalized at
the judgment rate of interest less the actual future earnings of the
injured business capitalized at the judgment rate of interest (a) plus
any increase in the net assets of the injured business, or (b) less any
decrease in the net assets of the injured business. 6 2
Provisions are included in the act defining methods for the estimation
of average earning, 163 expected future earnings,'64 and actual future
earnings. 165 In addition, the act provides for a maximum ceiling on
any award in an amount not exceeding the greater of "ten times the
average earnings of the injured business; or... an amount equal to the
value of the physical assets of the injured business.'166
It seems necessary only to make a simple change in terminology
to integrate the provisions of this model statute into a general statute
160 Id.
161 Id. at 446 (§ 501).
162 Id. (§ 302).
163 "Average earnings" means the average annual net income of a business dur-
ing the last five years prior to the valuation date. The salary of an owner-manager
to the extent that such salary is available to him in the same or similar employ-
ment shall be treated as an expense of the business and not as part Of net income.
If the salary of an oWner-manager does not reflect his economic value to the
injured business, additional salary, to the extent indicated in the preceding
sentencd, shall be imputed to him and treated as an expense of the injured busi-
ness.
Id. (§ 803).
164 The expected future earnings of the injured business shall be estimated
from its average earnings, adjusted to take into account extraordinary circum-
stances which indicate that the level of earnings would have changed in the
future if there had been no eminent domain proceedings.
Id. (§ 304).
165 The actual future earnings of the injured business shall be estimated from
its average earnings and earnings subsequent to the valuation date, so as to fairly
reflect the prospects for the business under the changed conditions caused by
the eminent domain proceedings.
Id. (§ 305).
166 Id. at 446-47 (§ 306). Ai2 important question under this provision is What method
to use in determining the value of the physical assets.
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compensating for business losses. The model act defines good will as
"the expectation of continued patronage by a regular clientele." 167
Business losses could be substituted for good will, with the introductory
definition then reading: "Business losses are a decrease in net earnings
caused by destruction of or damage to the expectancy of continued
patronage by a regular clientele." The elimination of good will from
the express terminology of the act would be of no real consequence,
because awards based on capitalization of expected future earnings
necessarily would include that item.168
Another approach to legislative change is to look at the problem
from the viewpoint of the business or personal relocation made neces-
sary by a condemnation. 69 This has been the approach of the federal
government' 7 and of some of the states. 171 The 1966 State Legislative
167 Id. at 445 (§ 102(a)).
168 See pp. 629-30 & notes 113-17 supra.
169 For a general discussion of the effects of displacement on small business by the
urban renewal and highway programs, see B. ZIMM-R, RFBUILDING CITIES: THE EffEcTs
OF DISPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION ON SasALL BUSINESS (1964).
170 For an analysis of the federal relocation practices, see Millspaugh, Problems and
Opportunities of Relocation, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 6 (1961). The various Federal Hous-
ing Acts have constantly expanded the amount available for relocation expense. Under the
1956 Act, local public agencies receiving federal funds were authorized to make payments
to dislocated business "for their reasonable and necessary moving expenses and any
actual direct losses of property," to a maximum of $2,000 per business firm. Act of Aug. 7,
1956, ch. 1028, § 305, 70 Stat. 1100. A 1957 amendment raised the limit to $2,500, Act of
July 12, 1957, § 304, 71 Stat. 800, and the 1959 Act raised it to $3,000. Act of Sept. 23, 1959,
§ 409(b), 73 Stat. 674. The 1961 Act changed the ceiling to "the total certified actual moving
expenses." Act of June 80, 1961, § 304(3), 75 Stat. 167.
The Office of the Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, has,
however, placed the ceiling at $25,000. 24 C.F.R. § 3.109(a) (2) (1967). Any payment
over $10,000 requires the approval of the Administrator. 24 C.F.R. § 3.104(g) (1967). An
interesting footnote to these amendments is that such relocation payments are covered
by 100% federal grant because of doubt concerning state constitutions and statutes per-
mitting the local bodies to extend compensation in excess of an acquisition award. In a
recent case in which the state in question had its own relocation reimbursement statute,
it was held that claims under both the state statute (N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 74-b
(McKinney 1965)) and under the Federal Housing Act should be asserted in administrative
proceedings prior to the primary court adjudication of the damage claim arising from
the taking. City of Buffalo v. Mollenberg-Betz Mach. Co., 53 Misc. 2d 849, 857, 279
N.Y.S.2d 842, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
Several other federal programs have provisions for relocation. The Small Business
Administration may give below-market interest loans of up to 30 years to assist small
businesses reestablish, if they suffer substantial economic injury as a result of construction
financed by the federal government. Act of June 30, 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (Supp. II,
1965-66), amending 15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1964).
The TVA was the first federal body empowered to provide relocation assistance.
Though it does not have authority to make direct relocation payments, it grants a
monetary allowance for moving expenses in determining its offer for property to be ac-
quired. See AvIsoRY COzM'N, supra note 93, at 83.
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Program of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions 72 recommends legislation that would either reimburse a displaced
person or business for the actual and reasonable expenses involved in
moving himself and his business, or give the claimant a fixed payment
in accordance with a fixed schedule under allowable maximums.17 3
In addition to those actually displaced by a governmental program,
those "adjacent to the real property acquired [who] are caused sub-
Relocation payments and assistance are provided to compensate a landowner or
tenant for public works projects of the military or acquisitions either by the Interior
Department (such as for water conservation) or the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration. Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 726, § 401(b), 66 Stat. 624; Act of May 29, 1958,
43 U.S.C. § 1231 (1964); National Aeronautics and Space Admin. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2473
(1964). All of the above statutes have language authorizing the agency in question to pay
for "expenses and... losses and damages incurred ... as a direct result of ... moving."
Acquisition by the Bureau of Public Roads under Act of Oct. 23, 1962, 23 U.S.C.
§ 133 (1964) has been extensive, and the Secretary of Commerce may approve, as part of
the cost of construction of any federal aid highway program, payments for moving ex-
penses to a business displaced from real property acquired for the project. A $3,000 maxi-
mum is established with the further limitation to a maximum distance of 50 miles.
171 According to information gathered by the Department of Commerce, 22 states
have statutory authorization for payment of moving costs. Several others pay such costs
pursuant to an attorney-general directive or decision of a state court. ADVIsoRY COmm'N,
supra note 93, at 69.
An illustrative statute is the N.Y. Cosmes. L. § 14 (McKinney Supp. 1967) which
provides:
In fixing the amount of such compensation the commissioners shall also in-
clude the reasonable and necessary expenses, not in excess of three hundred dol-
lars, incurred or to be incurred by a resident owner in moving household furni-
ture to his new residence.
A more comprehensive provision, extending also to the expenses of moving a business,
is contained in the N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAw § 74-b (McKinney Supp. 1967).
172 Each fall the ACIR publishes a program of suggested state legislation designed
to improve the workings of our federal system. The Commission is a permanent bi-
partisan group established under federal law enacted in 1959 to give continuing study to
the relationships among the three levels of government. Its membership is drawn from all
three levels, and it has a permanent staff in Washington.
173 U.S. ADVISORY CoMM'N ON INTERGOVERNIENTAL RELATIONS, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE
PROGRAM 266-67 (1965), sets forth "An Act to provide for uniform, fair, and equitable
treatment of persons, businesses, and nonprofit organizations displaced by state and
local programs" [hereinafter referred to as the Model Act]. Model Act § 2, "Relocation
Payments," provides:
(a) If the state or any unit of local government acquires real property for public
use, it shall make fair and reasonable relocation payments to displaced persons
and business concerns as required by this act.
(b) A relocation payment to a displaced person shall be (1) for actual and rea-
sonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or
other personal property, ... or (2) a fixed payment in accordance with a schedule
of fixed amounts approved by the [Governor].
One problem under the Model Act is the definition of "person" in § 11(2) as "any indi-
vidual, family, or owner of a business concern or farm operation." Quaere: Is a corporate
owner includable? It should be noted that New Jersey adopted the model statute with
few revisions. NJ. REv. STAT. § 52:31B-1 to -12 (Supp. 1967).
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stantial economic injury because of the public improvement f6r
which property is acquired"'174 may receive relocation services. The only
limitation on the type of business affected is that the definition of
'business concern" excludes those engaged in the "activity of holding
property for the production of income." 1" 5
Depending on the sufficiency of the payments determined in the
fixed schedtule, this approach may be most equitable in terms of placing
the parties in the position they were in prior to the dislocation. Under
a relocation cost progtam all business losses incident to the move, such
as nonfixture machinery and good Will, would be compensable. Insofar
as a statutory award depends on the determination of "reasonable"
moving expenses, however, implementation may be hindered by un-
necessarily restrictive interpretations similar to those tinder the com-
mon law. Therefore, if such a statute is passed, its effectiveness may
depend on how emphatically the legislative intention to assume liability
is stated on the face of the statute.
Legislative enactments in this area are not a simple matter and no
doubt will require careful preliminary analysis and drafting; None-
theless, not only is legislative change possible, but, iii some instances,
statutory language with a detailed body of judicial interpretations
already exists. If legislatures are persuaded as a matter of policy to
undertake statutory revision, there is simply no practical reason why
they should not enact a workable statute.
B. Constitutional Amendment
One axiom in the law of eminent domain is that not every govern-
mental interference with a person's economic interests is equivalent to
a compensable taking in the constitutional sense. This principle has
led the courts to develop tht qaestioriable distinctidn that the condem-
nation of business property results in a "taking" of only the lacnd, not
the business conducted on the land. A typical state constitution reads:
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation."176 Many states have held that "taking," as used in the con-
stitutional formulai can only be viewed in terms of what the states
174 Model Act, supia note 173, § B(a).
175 Id. § 11(4).
176 N.J CONST. art. I, 20. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
mandates: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
A similai limitation is imposed upon the states through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, tegardless of whether they have similar provigi6ois in their 6wli toristitt
tions. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v. dhicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897); Scbtt v. City of
Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395 (C.C.N.D. Ohio i8g8).
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physically receive as a result of the condemnation, not what the owner
is forced to give up, 77 At least in theory, however, this rule of decision
can be eliminated by changing the constitutional "taking" language
to "taken or damaged."' 78 Under this terminology the claim for
business losses could be included in the "or damaged" language.
Unlike the legislative revisions proposed above, constitutional
amendment would not have the advantage of statutory definitions and
guidelines. This would be of little consequence, however, since the
courts have never shown timidity in devising methods of compensation
when the propriety of such compensation was not in question. It should
be possible to calculate business losses proximately caused by a taking,
even in the absence of express formulas, by using the differences in
capitalized income before and after the condemnation. Legislative
studies and drafters' notes, however, would be indispensable to the
courts, since constitutional amendments in the area of compensation for
business losses, unlike those in other areas, have not been viewed as
self-implementing. 179
Constitutional amendment may be superior to legislative revision
in some areas of eminent domain valuation, since courts more often
have been spurred to substantial revision and innovation under the
former, while too often tending under the latter to indulge in nit-pick-
ing limitation and restriction'8 0 On the other hand, the generality of
constitutional amendment must be admitted, as must the possibility
that targets other than those initially intended will be hit by the amend-
ment. But this possibility should not deter the legislators, since the
propriety of further expansion lies in the sound discretion of the courts,
which more often than not have turned a deaf ear to such pleas.' 8'
177 In the view of these courts, the only item received by the state is the land itself.
See pp. 631-83 supra. The Florida courts have taken the most direct approach in opposi-
tion to this view. See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d
289, 292 (Fla. 1958). With respect to the Florida practice, see generally Comment, Com-
pensation for Moving Expenses in Eminent Domain, 6 ST, Louis U,L.J. 232, 245 (1960).
178 See 2 NIcHoxs' EMINENT DoMAIN, supra note 3, § 6.44 (listing states that have
enacted the "taken or damaged" formulation). But see 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 24, § 78.
179 Although the "damage" clause would be self-executing in that the owner could
recover in any ordinary civil action without additional legislative or judicial implementa-
tion, 2 NiCHOIS' EMINENT Do AiN, supra note 3, § 6.441[4], it apparently wol4ld not auto-
matically provide compensation for business lo ses without some specific explanation of
intent on the part of the draftsmen. $er id. § 0.443[2]; 1 L. ORGEL, 44pra note 24, § 78.
180 For example, the following cases illustrate the Illinois experience with the "or
damaged" amendment in changing the common law no-compensation rule for damages
resulting from loss of access: Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (11888); City of Chicago v.
Union Bldg. Ass'n, 102 IMI. 379 (1882); Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 III. 64 (1882).
141 See, e.g., the discussion of the judicial interpretation of Npii York statutes and
1968]
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Methods of limiting the scope of the "or damaged" provision are
further available in the already large number of cases decided under
such provisions. These cases have held that compensation will be paid
only if the damage affects the property owner specifically and is not
merely a part of that suffered by the public generally. 8 2 Also, com-
pensation for highly speculative and remote damages is uniformly
denied under the "or damaged" formulation.ls 3 Of course, a constitu-
tional amendment of this kind might be deemed "enabling" rather
than "mandatory" and as such dependent upon legislative implementa-
tion, possibly in the form of one or a combination of the proposed
statutes discussed previously. Despite this possibility, constitutional
amendment, like remedial legislation, should in all probability provide
a vehicle capable of at least partially solving the problem of compen-
sating for business losses in eminent domain. Without debating the
relative merits of these alternatives, suffice it to say that a solution to
the problem, regardless of the method, is long overdue.
CONCLUSION
Business losses, including damages to or destruction of good will,
should be compensable in eminent domain when proximately caused
by a condemnation. The courts of New York have apparently gone as
far as possible without remedial legislation or constitutional amend-
ment in making compensable a limited going concern value. Through
use of what we have designated a "specialty" theory, they have com-
pensated for damage to or destruction of nonfixture machinery and
equipment integrated into a going business. Constitutional challenges
could be raised to the failure to compensate for these losses, but it is
extremely unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would
overturn a half century of its own precedent, not to mention cases from
most of the states.8 4 Constitutional arguments can have a glitter all
municipal ordinances concerning change-of-grade or deprivation-of-access in Mayberry &
Aloi, supra note 128, at 608-19.
182 See 2 NicHOLs' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 6.44131]; Lenhoff, Development
of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLuM. L. Rav. 596, 613 (1942).
183 See, 4 NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, § 14.241. In addition to the
"speculative" damage theory, other theories regulating compensation under the taken or
damaged provision have been espoused by various courts. See 2 NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN,
supra note 3, §§ 6.441[11-[2].
184 Any number of valuation cases can be cited in which certiorari was denied or an
appeal dismissed by the United States Supreme Court. E.g., Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State,
16 N.Y.2d 1005, 212 N.E.2d 899, 265 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 818 (1966)
(change of grade and resultant deprivation of access); Northern Lights Shopping Center,
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their own as intellectual exercises, but the nation's highest court has
consistently elected not to trip the existing valuation balance. Perhaps
there is method to this apparent judicial madness: judicial policy
makers may sympathize with the cause but view action at the state level,
through legislative or constitutional amendment, as the proper vehicle.
Moreover, public outcry for the compensation of business losses in
eminent domain is conspicuously absent, and, insofar as courts appear
to be influenced by public outrage and frustration or at the very least by
vociferous scholastic commentary, the lack of such may be fatal to
judicial change.
Regardless of these problems with judicial revision, state-origin-
ated remedial legislation and constitutional amendment does appear
to provide a ready-made vehicle for solving the problem. Why the
continued difficulty? Quite simply, the states must be persuaded of the
general utility of initiating change. Failure to compensate for busi-
ness losses upsets the interaction of factors that otherwise could be
combined by entrepreneurs to produce marginal efficiency and result-
ing profits. Although public uses presumably benefit society generally,
the present compensation balance offsets these gains by dispropor-
tionate taxing of costs to those engaged in business. The old chestnut
that increased compensation will bankrupt the states has absolutely no
validity. If additional funds are necessary, they can easily and more
rationally be obtained by distributing the costs of public improvements
through the tax structure to the segment of the public sharing in the
benefit. This expedient is unlikely to overburden taxpayers generally,
because the potential of increased state financial exposure will no
doubt persuade public authorities to be more responsible in their
planning, bypassing businesses where possible. When the reason for
a rule disappears, the rule should be discarded. There never was a
valid reason for the no-compensation rule, which is all the more reason
for discarding it. Artificial distinctions without basis other than in
semantics must be replaced by an economically viable solution.
Inc. v. State, 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 3883, 256 N.Y.S.2d 184, cert. denied, 882 U.S. 826
(1965) (deprivation of access); National Biscuit Co. v. State, 11 N.Y.2d 748, 181 N.E.2d
457, 226 N.Y.S.2d 455, cert. denied, 870 US. 924 (1962) (deprivation of access); Banner
Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 583, 148 N.E. 688, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925) (loss of
going concern value and good will).
Compare Stoebuck, supra note 125, at 288, where the argument is made, on the basis
of projecting the results of the federal airport condemnation cases, that the Supreme
Court is likely to extend the range of compensable damage through application of the
theory that governmental action that would be a "nuisance" if done privately constitutes
a "taking."
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